

Extending Industry Specialization through Cross-Border Acquisitions

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ABSTRACT

We investigate the role of industry specialization in cross-border acquisitions. We find that acquirers from more specialized industries in a country are more likely to buy foreign targets in countries that are less specialized in these same industries. The magnitude of this specialization effect is stronger when cross-country and cross-industry differences in measures of human or technological capital are higher. Post-acquisition performance is higher when specialized acquirers purchase assets in less specialized industries. These results are consistent with management and localized industry know-how being mobile factors that provide an advantage that can be deployed on foreign assets.

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The last thirty years have witnessed a boom in cross-border mergers and acquisitions, with a large range of countries and industries participating in the globalization of corporate acquisitions. A voluminous literature highlights that country characteristics play an important role in explaining both the intensity and direction of cross-border acquisitions. Differences in countries' institutional quality, corporate governance, tax regimes, labor regulations, currency and stock market valuation, or cultural traits have been found to explain the flow of acquisitions between countries.

In this paper, we focus on the role of *industries* in explaining the geography of global acquisitions. In particular, we develop and test the idea that cross-border acquisitions are driven by differences between countries in their degree of specialization on particular economic activities. Specialization reflects differences in the relative efficiency of industries across countries. Such heterogeneity arises because of countries' unequal factor endowments (e.g. labor costs or access to natural resources), but also because of differences in the prevalence of industry-specific assets, such as knowhow, marketing ability, logistic expertise, or management skills that can develop in specific locations and generate industry agglomeration economies through localized information flows and spillovers. Local information flows and spillovers enable other firms to capitalize on such industry-specific assets in their development and growth, fostering industry agglomeration (e.g. Ellison and Glaeser (1997)), such as watch-making in Switzerland, information technology in the United States ("Silicon Valley"), or machinery and chemical manufacturing in Germany.

We argue that such industry-specific advantages linked to geographical concentration of knowledge,¹ are potentially mobile factors that can be profitably deployed on existing foreign assets. This idea builds on internalization theory arguing that firms can create value through foreign acquisitions by internalizing markets for some of their intangible assets (e.g. knowhow or managers' skills) and expanding their use inter-

¹Ellison and Glaeser (1999) show that only 20% of industry agglomeration patterns can be ascribed to natural cost advantages, leaving localized intra-industry spillovers a likely candidate for the remaining fraction.

nationally within their own boundaries (e.g. Hymer (1976) and Caves (1971)). This solution should prevail when industry-specific advantages cannot easily be traded at arm’s length abroad because of their intangible nature, especially when property rights are limited and contracts are hard to enforce in an international context. Firms can instead take control of existing foreign assets to expand the use and scale of their local industry-specific advantage and deploy their mobile intangible resources on targets’ immobile capabilities (e.g. existing machines and equipment, distribution network, or political connections).

We conjecture that the specialization of a country in a particular industry reflects an industry-specific advantage, either comparative or absolute, that firms can exploit via cross-border capital reallocation, by deploying their domestic advantages on existing foreign assets. While acquirers may benefit from industry agglomeration economies when they expand, competitors in the target nation will not be able to benefit to the same extent as they will not have access to all the industry local information flows and spillovers in the acquirer home country. Acquisition flows in a given industry should thus increase with the specialization of the acquirer’s industry, and involve the purchase of assets located in countries that are less specialized in that industry. This forms our central hypothesis, and we provide evidence thereof. This industry-based motive for cross-border acquisitions is distinct from other motives in the existing empirical literature that overwhelmingly rely on country-level differences.²

We analyze a large sample of 36,105 horizontal cross-border deals cumulatively valued in excess of \$3.2 trillion involving private and public acquirers and targets from 46 countries and 85 industries over the period from 1990 through 2010.³ We empirically measure the degree of specialization of a country in a given industry by comparing the domestic share of production of that industry to the average share of that

²Such as sourcing cheaper factors of production (Yeaple (2003)), tariff jumping and foreign market access (Brainard (1997)), buying undervalued assets (Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2012)), extending governance practices abroad (Bris and Cabolis (2008), Rossi and Volpin (2004)), or the presence of institutional investors (Ferreira, Massa, and Matos (2010)).

³Because extending specialized resources abroad mainly operates within industries, our tests focus on horizontal transactions (firms acquiring targets in the same industry but different countries.)

industry worldwide. Countries are specialized in industries whose share of production (i.e. domestic economic importance) are large compared to the rest of the world.⁴

We find that cross-border horizontal transactions occur primarily between firms operating in relatively specialized industries. However, we observe large differences in the degrees of specialization between acquirers and targets. Overall, more than 60% of all transactions involve acquirers that are more specialized than targets. Across all industries, firms in more specialized industries buy assets in less specialized industries. The difference in specialization is economically substantial as acquirers display levels of specialization that are roughly 25% larger than that of targets. This pattern is strong and pervasive as it holds with various measures of specialization, in every year of the sample period, and is present across most countries and industries.

Our results show that differences in specialization are an important driver of acquisition flows even after controlling for a whole host of determinants that have been shown to influence cross-border transactions (e.g. countries' size, economic and financial development, or institutional quality). Regressions confirms that the intensity of acquisition flows across industry-country pairs is positively related to differences in industry specialization. The magnitude of the specialization effect is large. For the average industry, a one standard deviation increase in the difference in specialization between two countries is associated with an increase of 14.6% in the number of deals, and a 56.5% increase in aggregate transaction value.

We address concerns about potential reverse causality and endogeneity in several ways. First, we use cross-country differences in adoption rates of industry-specific technological innovations (e.g. the car or the telephone) measured in the early part of the twentieth century (from Comin and Hobijn (2009)) as instrument for specialization. First-stage results indicate that early adoption of technology (e.g. the number of cars per capita in Germany in 1900) strongly predicts present-days specialization (the spe-

⁴As we detail in the next section, the reason why industry specialization should procure an advantage for global acquirers is outside the scope of the usual Ricardian or Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theories of international trade that focus on cost or factor availability and immobile factors of production.

cialization of Germany in automobiles). Second-stage estimations confirm the positive impact of specialization on the cross-border acquisition flows. Second, we show our results are robust to the inclusion of industry-country-pairs fixed effects, indicating that there are more acquisitions in a given industry between two countries when the difference in *industry* specialization increases over time. These results rule out explanations for the specialization effect that are based on unobserved time-invariant differences between countries and industries.

We further show that our findings are hard to reconcile with alternative motives for cross-border acquisitions. In particular, we show that the role of specialization in cross-border transactions cannot be explained by differences in absolute size or economic importance between the acquiring and target industries (e.g. global market share or the number of firms). Also, we show that our results do not reflect differences in product market competition, access to finance, or asset valuation between countries and industries. In addition, the effect of industry specialization is not a peculiarity of acquisitions of emerging market firms by developed market firms: The specialization effect is prevalent for transactions involving firms coming from both developed and emerging markets acquiring assets in both developed and emerging markets.

We also explore in a deal-level analysis whether industry specialization predicts the countries in which an acquirer would pick targets, and the countries from which a target would attract buyers. Selection model estimations (conditional logit) reveal that a country-industry displaying a low degree of specialization is significantly more likely to become a target compared to the same industry in other countries matched on similar cross-border merger activity. In contrast, acquirers are more likely to come from country-industries that exhibit a higher level of specialization.

We provide evidence that the role of specialization in cross-border acquisitions is related to measures of human capital. Differences in industry specialization have the largest effect on acquisition flows when the acquirer country has a higher level of educational attainment than the target country. The economic effect of the differences

in educational attainment is roughly 50% larger when the acquirer country has a larger share of its population with a tertiary education or when it allocates a larger fraction of public resources to education. The influence of specialization is also tied to measures of technological capital as the specialization effect is magnified when the acquirer country benefits from a larger stock of patents, trademarks or published scientific articles per capita compared to the target country.

We further confirm these results using differences in human and technological capital between countries and industries. Using industry data for 29 European and major OECD countries, we find that the intensity of cross-border acquisitions in a given industry between two countries is substantially larger when the acquiring country-industry employs a higher fraction of skilled people than the industry in the target country. We also observe more acquisitions when the acquiring country-industry has adopted more information technology and exhibits a larger stock of R&D.

Differences in specialization are also related to acquisition outcomes. We find that (one- and three-year) operating performance following an international acquisition (by public firms) is significantly better when the acquirer is from a more specialized industry than the target. These results suggest that the benefit of acquiring less specialized foreign assets is related to the ability of specialized buyers to operate the purchased assets more efficiently by deploying mobile industry-specific resources.

Overall our paper adds to the growing literature examining the determinants of cross-border acquisition flows. We depart from most existing studies by focusing on industries and the importance of mobile industry-specific resources, as opposed to country-level determinants.⁵ To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study to show that the intensity of cross-border acquisitions is related to differences in industry specialization.⁶ Our results are broadly consistent with the “organizational capabil-

⁵Alquist, Mukherjee, and Tesar (2014) also focus on industries, but concentrate on the role of external finance dependence.

⁶Two papers present results that are related to ours. Brakman, Garretsen, and Marrewijk (2007) look at a sample of cross-border mergers between five OECD countries in 20 aggregate sectors over the period 1980-2004. They document that acquirers are more likely to come from sectors that have a comparative advantage in exporting. Similarly, Feliciano and Lipsey (2010) document the acquisitions

ities” theory of the firm advanced by Lucas (1978), Rosen (1982), or more recently Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) or Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009) according to which firm expansion spreads the use of higher-quality resources (e.g. knowhow or managerial talent) to a larger set of productive assets. Our findings suggest that this assignment view of firm boundaries applies to firms’ willingness to extend local industry-specific advantages abroad through cross-border acquisitions.

Ours is not the first paper to link firms’ multinationality to different dimensions of asset intangibility (see Caves (2007) for a comprehensive survey). For instance, existing research indicates that multinationals tend to operate in R&D intensive industries (e.g. Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) or Yeaple (2003)). The stock market reaction to foreign acquisitions increases with the acquirer’s R&D and patent intensity (e.g. Morck and Yeung (1992) or Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar (2010)). Multinationals transfer new technology and management practices to their existing foreign affiliates (e.g. Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley (2006) or Bloom, Sadun, and Reenen (2012)). The novelty of our paper is to rely on industry specialization as an aggregate measure of hard-to-quantify intangible assets (such as knowhow, expertise, or human capital). As this measure applies to both public and private firms across countries and industries, we can show that differences in specialization is an economically important determinant of cross-border acquisition flows, and more broadly, the reallocation of capital and control across borders.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss theoretical foundations and develop our hypotheses in Section I. Section II describes the measures of specialization and the sample of cross-border acquisitions. Section III presents the specialization profiles of acquiring and target firms. Section IV presents empirical tests of the effect of industry specialization on cross-border acquisitions. Section V presents the role played by intangibles. Section VI examines post transaction outcomes and discusses the robustness of our main results, whereas Section VII concludes.

of U.S. firms tend to occur in industries in which the acquiring country has a comparative advantage at exporting.

I Hypotheses Development

Industry specialization plays a prominent role in international economics, going back to David Ricardo’s classical example of trade in wine and cloth between Portugal and England and the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage. Countries differ in the *relative* efficiency of their industries, and hence they specialize to capitalize on these advantages. In the original formulation, countries gain from trade because they have access to different labor costs, technologies, or natural resources. Recent research highlights that specialization also arise because of industry-specific differences between countries, that could generate advantages that are comparative or absolute. An extensive empirical literature indicates industry specialization is an important determinant of trade flows (Costinot and Donaldson (2012) or Eaton and Kortum (2012)). Our central hypothesis is that industry specialization is also relevant for the understanding of cross-border acquisitions flows.⁷

Our main hypothesis builds on the theory literature that uses formal industrial organization models to study the motives of international acquisitions. In particular, Neary (2007) and Nocke and Yeaple (2007) develop rationales for cross-border acquisitions based on differences in product market specificities between countries. According to Neary (2007), after market liberalization that allows for foreign expansion through acquisitions, firms with a cost advantage – specialized firms – will purchase assets in markets with a comparative cost disadvantage. In a Cournot-Nash model, a cross-border horizontal acquisition typically eliminates a competitor and thus produces a bigger advantage for the remaining competitors than for the acquirer itself. Yet, Neary (2007) shows that if the cost differential is sufficient, the acquirer will still find the acquisition valuable if it can lower the production cost of the target. In other words, the value of acquiring foreign assets originates in the ability of the acquirer to apply

⁷Foreign acquisitions could arise from either comparative or absolute advantage. Our measures of specialization should capture specific industry strength that can be extended abroad, whether it is based comparative or absolute advantage. We remain agnostic as to which of the two is driving cross-border acquisitions.

its existing domestic costs to operate the acquired assets.

While the theory suggests a link between industry specialization and cross-border acquisitions, it is silent on the sources of the acquirers' advantage. The models assume that differences in production "costs" are exogenous, and that the acquirer can freely move resources overseas to apply its local production "costs" on the new assets it purchases abroad. We argue that cross-country differences in costs in a given industry are reflected by differences in industry specialization. Following traditional trade theory, industry specialization is the consequence of specific country-level advantages. The recent trade literature further indicates that such local advantages are not solely generated by country-level endowment differences, but also by the prevalence of local industry-specific assets. Industry specialization also strengthens over time because of agglomeration economies where producers in a specialized industry benefit from local externalities (e.g. Krugman, Obstfeld, and Melitz (2011) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2010)). Prominent among these is the importance of industry clusters of development and production knowhow (e.g. Porter (1990) and Ellison and Glaeser (1997)). To the extent that differences in industry specialization across countries reflects differences in production costs, we can formulate the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1 *The intensity of cross-border acquisitions in a given industry increases with differences in industry specialization between the acquiring and target industries.*

To be deployed on foreign assets, localized industry-specific advantages should be *mobile*. Hence, they are likely to be composed of intangible assets, such as knowhow, marketing ability, logistic expertise, or management skills. These intangible assets are also the main drivers of local industry spillovers as emphasized by Ellison and Glaeser (1997) which gives rise to strong country-industry advantages, in addition to firm-specific advantage. It is also important that these local industry spillovers are not dissipated overseas and remain localized when an industry firm extends its reach overseas. That the sources of intangible assets and knowhow stay local seems plausible given that these clusters of agglomeration, which are the source of continued industry

advantage, remain highly persistent over time. Thus, firms in the target country cannot benefit to the same extent from the information spillovers as they are not present in the acquirer's specialized home industry.

Intangible assets such as knowhow are notoriously difficult to exchange at arm-length in foreign markets because of limited protection of property rights abroad. Firms may thus be reluctant to rely on or use contracts abroad given that they cannot in many cases effectively protect their property rights, consistent with the predictions of the transaction cost theory of the firm (e.g. Williamson (1979)) and the property rights theory of the firm (e.g. Grossman and Hart (1986)). Hence, to profitably extend localized industry-specific advantage abroad, firms need to take formal control of foreign assets to reduce contracting costs and to mitigate the potential loss of intangible assets.

This idea is consistent with the internalization theory featured in Hymer (1976) and Caves (1971) conjecturing that foreign acquisitions occur when firms can increase their value by internalizing the markets for some of their intangible assets. Similarly, the resource-based view of the firm in the international business literature (e.g. Penrose (1959) or Wernerfelt (1984)) views intangible assets as proprietary resources and capabilities that generate an advantage in international acquisitions and foreign direct investment (e.g. Hymer (1976)), but also as the resources that firms can most easily deploy abroad (e.g. Caves (2007)). The theory of multinational firms also recognizes intangible assets, such as technological knowhow, marketing knowledge, management expertise and human capital, as a main driver behind a firm's decision to make cross-border acquisitions (e.g. Caves (2007)). On these grounds, we thus expect the importance of industry specialization for cross-border acquisitions to be especially relevant when localized industry-specific advantages results from intangible assets. This forms our second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2 *The intensity of cross-border acquisitions in a given industry explained by differences in specialization increases with measures of intangible assets.*

II Data

This section describes the sample and how we construct the data used in the tests. It consists of three main blocks: (1) the measures of industry specialization, (2) the mergers and acquisition data, and (3) country-level variables.

A Industry Specialization

Our objective is to develop a measure of specialization for each country and industry. To do so, we follow the concept of “revealed comparative advantage” that is extensively used in the literature on international trade. As explained in Krugman, Obstfeld, and Melitz (2011) a country is considered to have an advantage in a given industry when the importance of that industry’s exports relative to the rest of the world’s exports in that industry is large. Following our theoretical considerations in Section I, countries tend to be specialized in industries in which they have a comparative (or absolute) advantage, and specialization further enhances such advantage through economies of scale, external economies and agglomeration effects. Thus we measure industry specialization in terms of the economic importance of industries, and not exports.

Following the original formulation by Balassa (1965) and replacing exports by measures of output or employment, we define $w_{i,c,t}$ as the share of industry i ’s production (or employment) in country c ’s total production (or employment) in year t . Similarly, we define $\overline{w_{i,t}}$ as the average share of industry i ’s production worldwide, computed as $\frac{1}{N_c} \sum_c w_{c,i,t}$, where N_c is the number of countries in our sample. We then define industry specialization, SP , as follows:

$$SP_{c,i,t} = \frac{w_{c,i,t}}{\overline{w_{i,t}}} \quad (1)$$

At time t , country c is defined as being “specialized” in industry i if the share of i ’s production ($w_{c,i}$) in country c ’s total production is larger than the average share of i ’s production worldwide ($\overline{w_{i,t}}$). Hence, a country is relatively specialized in industries for

which $SP_{c,i,t}$ is higher than one, i.e., when production in these industries is more than expected on the basis of the average importance worldwide. As a result, a higher value of SP indicates a higher degree of specialization.

To fix ideas, this definition implies for instance (as shown empirically below) that Switzerland is highly specialized in manufacturing watches and clocks. This is because the share of the watch industry (in the total Swiss output) is much larger in Switzerland than in any other country. In our analysis we remain agnostic about the origin of specialization.⁸ We hypothesize that industry specialization reveals strengths in specific economic sectors. This strength could originate from unique country- or industry-specific factors such as natural resources, know-how, expertise, scale, cluster effects, or specific governmental policies. To wit, we abstract from the reasons why Switzerland is highly specialized in manufacturing watches, but use the fact that Switzerland has a clear local advantage in producing watches relative to the rest of the world to analyze the geography and industry composition of cross-border acquisitions.⁹

We use disaggregated firm-level data for publicly listed companies from Worldscope to measure specialization for each country-industry-year observation ($SP_{c,i,t}$). We focus on the period 1990 to 2010. We consider two variables to capture industries' importance: sales and employment. We define industries based on three-digit International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC Rev. 3) used by the United Nations Statistics Division.¹⁰ We thus classify each firm in Worldscope into a three-digit ISIC code using the primary SIC codes provided by Worldscope and the correspondence between ISIC and SIC described in Appendix 2. We further exclude natural resources industries because, by definition, countries without access to natural resources cannot specialize in these industries, potentially introducing censoring and biases in our estimations.¹¹

⁸See Costinot (2009) for more about the origin of comparative advantage and specialization.

⁹We discuss the potential endogeneity of our measure of specialization in Section IV.C.

¹⁰<https://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=2>

¹¹Including natural resources industries in the analysis delivers very similar results (see the Internet Appendix).

The starting sample comprises 1,067,534 observations on 50,886 distinct firms, corresponding to 46 countries, 89 industries, and 21 years. Ideally, we would like to compute $SP_{c,i,t}$ for every country-industry-year observation, that is 85,974 observations ($46 \times 89 \times 21$). However, Worldscope does not contain sales or employment data for each possible country-industry-year observation.¹² Thus, we impose a minimum of three countries with non-missing industry-year observations on sales or employment (across 46 countries) to remain in the sample, and exclude all industry-year observations that do not meet this requirement. This step eliminates 5,520 industry-year observations with missing sales, and 5,796 observations with missing employment, corresponding to four industries. For the remaining observations, we assume that a missing country-industry-year observation reflects the absence of economic activities in these industries, and set $w_{c,i,t}$ to zero.¹³ Out of 85,974 possible observations, we have 80,454 (non-missing) measures of specialization based on sales ($SP(sales)$) and 80,178 based on employment ($SP(emp)$) spanning 85 distinct industries.

[Insert Table 1 Here]

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the measures of industry specialization across countries. Panel A reveals that, by construction, the average level of specialization worldwide is equal to unity. Notably, the within-country distribution of specialization appears highly skewed. While there are many industries that are present in each country in similar proportion (i.e. nonspecialized industries), a few industries account for a disproportionately large fraction of each country's activities. We also note an important heterogeneity in the average degree of specialization across countries. For instance, the United States, Japan, Australia, or Switzerland display a large average degree of specialization (all well above unity – indicating more diversity in highly specialized industries) compared to countries like Venezuela, Hungary, or Czech Republic.¹⁴

¹²This happens because of incomplete coverage or because of the absence of publicly traded companies in every industry and every country.

¹³All our results continue to hold if we only consider non-missing observations to compute $w_{i,c,t}$. The resulting sample is however much smaller.

¹⁴The link between average country specialization and economic development appears strong.

To further illustrate the differences in specialization patterns across countries and industries, Panel B of Table 1 reports the two most specialized industries in each country, where specialization is based on sales and averaged over the period 1990-2010. For instance, and as indicated above, we observe that the most specialized industry in Switzerland is the “Manufacture of watches and clocks”. Similarly, Germany is (relatively) specialized in “Retail trade”, the UK in “Legal, accounting, and auditing activities”, Russia in “Transport via pipeline”, and the US in “Renting of transport equipment” and “Education”. Overall, Table 1 underlines an important heterogeneity in industry specialization across countries.

We acknowledge that, while informative, our measure of industry specialization is imperfect. Indeed, Worldscope only includes data on public firms, rendering our measures probably biased towards activities that feature more public equity capital. However, one advantage of using Worldscope’s is that its broad coverage enables us to measure specialization for a large set of countries, industries, and years. Nevertheless, as an alternative, we use aggregated industry-level data on output and employment from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) Indstat4 database. This database has output and employment data that covers all firms - both private and publicly traded. Industries in the UNIDO database are defined at the ISIC three-digit level, covers the manufacturing sector between 1990 and 2006, and is limited to a subset of countries. We have information on 47 manufacturing industries (out of 89) and 43 countries (out of 46).¹⁵ As before, we only retain observations if at least three countries report non-missing industry-year observations on sales or employment, and set $w_{c,i,t}$ to zero for the missing country-industry-year observations. Among the 42,441 possible observations, we have 33,637 measures of specialization based on sales and 32,766 measures of specialization based on employment. Reassuringly, the correlation between Worldscope-based and UNIDO-based measures of specialization is

Hence, we control for such factors in the multivariate analysis below. Moreover, we show in the Internet Appendix that our results hold when we focus on distinct country-pairs where differences in development and specialization are small.

¹⁵The missing countries are Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Venezuela.

0.28 (for $SP(sales)$) and 0.24 (for $SP(emp)$).

B Mergers and Acquisitions Data

The sample of transactions is obtained from the Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) Mergers and Corporate Transaction database and includes all deals (domestic and cross-border) announced between 1990 and 2010 that are completed by the end of 2012. Similar to Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2012) we exclude LBOs, spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tender offers, exchange offers, repurchases, partial equity stakes, acquisitions of remaining interest, privatizations, as well as deals in which the target or the acquirer is a government agency. We consider public, private and subsidiary acquirers and targets. We limit our attention to the 46 largest countries (see Table 1). This subset represents 93% of all SDC transactions and 96% of the world equity market capitalization (in 2010).¹⁶ We only retain transactions where both the acquirer and target have non-missing measures of specialization (this eliminates 1,048 transactions). Our sample includes 365,496 transactions with a total value of \$21 trillion. We use the primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) provided by SDC to assign each acquirer and target to one of 85 distinct ISIC industries.

[Insert Table 2 Here]

Table 2 displays the characteristics of the sample of global mergers and acquisitions. Panel A indicates that during the sample period 22.2% of all transactions (81,139) involve firms from different countries. Cross-border deals have a total value of \$5.9 trillion, or 27.4% of all deal value.¹⁷ In line with Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2012) and Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi (2010), Panel B reveals that the world market for acquisitions exhibits a substantial geographic heterogeneity. The US, the UK, Germany and Japan account for the majority of transactions. Among the possible 2,116 country pairs (46×46), 1,571 (70.8%) feature at least one transaction. On average, firms in a

¹⁶This figure is based on data from the Worldbank in 2010.

¹⁷UNCTAD (2013) reports a cumulative cross-border M&A volume of \$7.18 trillion worldwide for the 1990-2010 period. Including natural resources, our sample contains cross-border deals with a combined value of \$6.5 trillion, and thus appears to cover 90% of the global volume based on values.

given country are involved in deals in 34 different countries. Notably, 73% of all cross-border transactions (and 83% of total deal value) occur between firms from developed countries, where development levels are taken from the Standard and Poor’s Emerging Market Database.

Relevant for our investigation, acquisitions comprise a strong industry component. Across all deals (domestic and cross-border) 44% occur between firms operating in the same industries. This fraction is roughly similar between domestic deals and cross-border deals. There is a total of 36,105 cross-border horizontal transactions, representing a total value of \$3.2 trillion or 54% of all cross-border transactions. These transactions are the main focus of our analysis. Notably cross-border horizontal deals span a non-negligible part of the potential global network in each industry. Across the 175,950 possible horizontal cross-border pairs ($46 \times 45 \times 85$), 11,433 (or 6.5%) feature at least one transaction. The average industry has horizontal deals involving 125 country-pairs.

C Country Characteristics

Existing research indicates that countries’ economic, institutional, cultural, and geographical characteristics are associated with the direction and intensity of cross-border acquisition activity. Since such characteristics are likely related to the patterns of industry specialization, we control for a host of country factors in our tests. All the variables used in the analysis are further detailed in Appendix 1.

Following Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi (2010), we use data from the Worldbank on annual GDP and GDP per capita to capture a country’s size and level of development. Using data from the World Integration Trade Solution (WITS), we compute bilateral trade flows (imports and exports) between any two countries. We obtain data on the average corporate tax rate for each country from the Economic Freedom Index. We also identify if two countries have double-taxation and bilateral investment treaty agreements for each year in our sample from the United Nations Conference

on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) database. We obtain national exchange rates from Datastream, and define the nominal exchange rate returns (between each pair of countries) as the average annual difference in the logarithm of the monthly exchange rate. We obtain real exchange rate returns by using each country’s consumer price index and convert all nominal returns to the 2000 price level for Europe.

We use data from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) to capture different institutional characteristics. Similar to Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi (2010) we consider a country’s legal origin. We also consider language and religion as cultural factors related to cross-border acquisitions. As in Stulz and Williamson (2003) we gather data on the primary language spoken in each country (English, Spanish, or Others) from CIA World Factbook 2008. We also consider the dominant religion in each country (Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Buddhist or Others). We further obtain the geographical distance between each country’s largest city (in terms of population) or its capital from the Centre d’Etude Prospective et d’Information Internationale (CEPII). To alternately measure the geographic closeness between countries, we use a dummy variable that is equal to one if two countries share a common border.

Finally, in order to examine more directly whether our results are related to country-level stock of intangible capital, we consider several factors related to human and technological capital. Following Barro and Lee (2013), we consider the fraction of public spending on education in total government expenditures as well as the fraction of the labor force with a tertiary education to measure the stock of human capital in a given country. These variables are from the Barro-Lee Educational Attainment Dataset.¹⁸ Similarly, we measure countries’ stocks of technological capital using information from the Worldbank on the number of patents per capita, the number of trademarks per capita, and the number of articles published in scientific journals per capita.

¹⁸Available at <http://www.barrolee.com/>

III Profile of Acquirers and Targets

We start our investigation by examining the univariate patterns of specialization across all mergers and acquisitions. For each transaction, we compare the degree of specialization of the acquirer's industry to that of the target. We report these univariate comparisons in Table 3. Several notable results emerge from this table.

[Insert Table 3 Here]

In Panel A, we first observe that across all transactions (including domestic, cross-border, horizontal and non-horizontal), participating firms appear to be relatively specialized. The average values of SP for both acquirers and targets are larger than one. This suggests that, perhaps unsurprisingly, takeover transactions mostly involve firms operating in industries exhibiting high degrees of specialization. Across all deals, and with both measures of specialization ($SP(sales)$ and $SP(emp)$), we observe almost no difference in the average (and median) degree of specialization between acquirers and targets.

Yet, we see a very different picture when we look separately at domestic and cross-border deals. In domestic deals, targets appear to be more specialized than acquirers (with average values of SP between 1.981 and 2.033 for targets and between 1.854 and 1.898 for acquirers). In sharp contrast, acquirers appear to be more specialized than targets in cross-border transactions (with average values of SP between 1.894 and 1.908 for acquirers and a value of 1.501 for targets).

The difference in specialization is even larger in Panel B where we focus only on horizontal transactions. Acquirers display degrees of specialization that are roughly 25% larger than targets. These differences are statistically and economically significant. For instance, while the average (median) value of $SP(sales)$ is 1.981 (1.235) for acquirers, it amounts to 1.458 (0.886) for targets. This clear pattern indicates that for cross-border transactions involving firms from the same industry, more specialized acquirers buy less specialized target.

The effect of specialization is sizeable. Panel C indicates that more than 63% of all horizontal cross-border transactions involve acquirers that operate in more specialized industries than targets. Together these transactions amount to \$2.3 trillion, or 67% of the total value of cross-border horizontal transactions over our sample period. In all, a substantial fraction of asset ownership reallocations across borders occurs between more specialized acquirers and less specialized target firms.

[Insert Figures A, B, C, and D Here]

Figures A, B, C and D highlight that the observed difference in specialization between acquirers and targets in horizontal cross-border deals is present across countries, time, and industries. Figures A and B display the average difference in SP (labeled ΔSP) by acquirer and target countries (sorted in ascending order). For acquirer countries, we observe that ΔSP is positive in 35 countries out of 46 countries in our sample. For target countries, ΔSP is positive in 40 countries, based on sales (similar for employment).¹⁹ Figure C further confirms the finding that acquirer is more specialized than target holds for every single year in our sample. Finally, Figure D displays ΔSP by industry. Here again, ΔSP is positive in 72 distinct industries, and negative in only 13 industries for sales (69 vs. 16 for employment).

The above univariate results reveal important differences in specialization between acquirers and targets in cross-border transactions that involve firms in the same industry. Overall, acquirers are significantly more specialized than targets. This is consistent with the hypothesis that firms acquire foreign assets to extend their specialization overseas. Moreover, the univariate results highlight important variation between countries, industries, and time. We account for these differences in the next section.

¹⁹The corresponding figures for employment are contained in the Internet Appendix. Taiwan is an outlier with very few deals.

IV Determinants of Acquisition Flows

To more formally examine the interplay between differences in specialization and acquisition flows across countries and industries, we turn to a multivariate analysis. We start by discussing the empirical specification, present the main results, and then turn to identification concerns, alternative explanations and robustness tests.

A Empirical Specification

To examine how differences in industry specialization influence horizontal cross-border acquisition flows, we follow Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi (2010) and Karolyi and Taboada (2014) and use a specification that resembles gravity models used to study trade flows (e.g. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) or Anderson (2011)). Gravity models typically relate the intensity of trade between two countries to the benefits of trade and various measures of barriers to trade, such as distance, tariffs, exchange rate regimes, ethnic ties, linguistic identity or international borders (e.g. Anderson and Wincoop (2003)). In a similar spirit, we empirically link bilateral acquisition flows to the expected benefits and barriers associated with cross-border transactions. Our baseline specification is as follows:

$$\log(1 + V_{c,c',i}) = \alpha + \beta \Delta SP_{c,c',i} + \gamma X_c + \delta X_{c'} + \eta X_{c,c'} + v_i + \varepsilon_{c,c',i}, \quad (2)$$

where $V_{c,c',i}$ is the aggregate volume of horizontal acquisitions in industry i between acquirer country c and target country c' . We use two measures for V : the total number of acquisitions ($\#Acq.$) and the total dollar value of acquisitions ($\$Acq.$). The variable of interest, $\Delta SP_{c,c',i}$ measures the difference in specialization between countries c and c' in industry i . The vectors X_c , $X_{c'}$, and $X_{c,c'}$ include several acquirer and target country-level characteristics, as well as country-pair characteristics (e.g. common border or language). The vector v_i includes industry fixed effects.

The coefficient of interest in equation (2) β measures whether, for a given industry

i , the intensity of cross-border acquisitions between (acquirer) country A and (target) country B is explained by differences in their specialization in i , after controlling for a host of country and industry characteristics related to acquisition costs and benefits. Arguably acquisitions occur only when the combined expected benefits of the acquirer and target are positive. Our main hypothesis is that, all else equal, such expected benefits are larger when potential acquirers can deploy their mobile specialized assets on the targets' assets, i.e. when the difference in specialization is positive. Hence, we expect a positive β coefficient, indicating that for a given industry i acquisitions flow from countries that are more specialized in i (e.g. watch-making in Switzerland) to countries that are less specialized in i (e.g. watch-making in the United States).

Note that when the expected benefits are negative we should observe no transaction. As a result the dependent variable $V_{c,c',i}$ is naturally truncated at zero. In our context, this happens frequently as industry-country pairs featuring at least one transaction over the 1990-2010 period represents only 6.5% of the sample. We account for this truncation by estimating equation (2) using a Tobit specification. We further account for the possible within-country correlation by clustering standard errors at the acquirer and target country level.

In our baseline tests, we focus primarily on cross-sectional variation and ignore the time-series dimension that we consider in Section IV.C. Thus in our cross-sectional tests, we take the average values of all variables over the sample period. We collapse all 21 years into a single cross-sectional regression with 175,950 industry-country pairs ($46 \times 45 \times 85$ combinations of acquirer country, target country, and industry). As a result of this aggregation, X_c and $X_{c'}$ capture country-level effects. Any effect that occurs because the acquirer country is larger or more developed than a target country is absorbed by the country variables.²⁰ Similarly, any effect that occurs because of a particular industry characteristic is absorbed by v_i . Table 4 provides summary

²⁰We obtain similar results if we include acquirer and target country fixed effects instead of country level variables (we report the results in the Internet Appendix Tables A.2 and A.3), but prefer to use country variables to compare (and validate) the effects of country characteristics with that documented by existing research.

statistics for all variables used in the regressions.

[Insert Table 4 Here]

B Baseline Results

The first four columns of Table 5 present the results of the baseline model where the dependent variables are either the (log of the) number of deals ($\ln(\#\text{Acq.})$) or the (log of the) aggregate value of deals ($\ln(\$ \text{Acq.})$). The measures for the difference in specialization between industry-country pairs $\Delta SP_{c,c',i}$ are based on sales $\Delta SP(\text{sales})$ and employment $\Delta SP(\text{emp})$. Notably, the estimated coefficients on ΔSP are positive across all specifications. All estimates are highly significant with t -statistics ranging between 7.9 and 11.9.

[Insert Table 5 Here]

The economic magnitude of the effect of specialization differences on the intensity of cross-border acquisitions is substantial. A one-standard deviation increase in $\Delta SP(\text{sales})$ is associated with a 14.6% increase in the number of deals, and a 56.5% increase in the aggregate value of deals. Similarly, a one-standard deviation change in $\Delta SP(\text{emp})$ is associated with 13.3% more deals, and an aggregate value of deals that is larger by 49.6%.²¹

The baseline specifications contain a large number of control variables, capturing effects that are known to correlate with cross-border acquisition activity. The estimates reported in Table 5 are in line with previous research. For instance, larger economies (measured by log GDP) participate more in cross-border acquisitions. More developed countries, as measured by their GDP per capita, also feature more cross-border horizontal transactions. We also see more cross-border deals when country-pairs display more bilateral trade. Consistent with Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2012), we find that an appreciation of the acquirer currency relative to the target currency positively influences deal flows. Moreover, transaction intensity increases with closer geographic

²¹The variables ΔSP are normalized to a unit variance so the coefficients reported in Table 5 and following tables can be interpreted directly.

proximity, and also when countries share the same language or the same legal origin (but not when they have the same religion).

Our results remain virtually similar if we replace the control variables with country-pair fixed effects in the four last columns of Table 3. This confirms that the effect of industry specialization on cross-border acquisition flows is not capturing time-invariant differences across countries, such as differences in legal origins or constant institutional settings.

[Insert Table 6 Here]

In Table 6, we replace the Worldscope-based specialization measures with measures constructed from all private and public firms from UNIDO (as defined in Section II.A). Because UNIDO only covers the manufacturing sector for 43 countries, the size of the sample is considerably reduced. Remarkably, the estimated coefficient for ΔSP remains positive and significant in all specifications. Even though the economic magnitude of the specialization effect is reduced, it remains considerable with a 5% increase in number of deals and a 20% increase in value of deals with a one-standard deviation increase in ΔSP .

C Identification

While the above results are consistent with differences in specialization having a large effect on the volume of cross-border acquisitions, our interpretation could be biased by possible omitted variables or reverse causality issues. A first concern is that reverse-causation leads specialization differences to increase *in response* to cross-border acquisition activity. Another concern is that both industry specialization and the intensity of cross-border acquisition could be correlated with factors not included in our estimations.

To examine the issue of reverse causality, we rely on an instrumental variable approach, and develop an instrument for specialization based on countries' adoption of key technological innovations in the first half of the twentieth century (1900-1950).

The logic is that today’s degree of specialization of a country in a specific industry can be traced back to the early adoption of the technology that this industry builds on. For instance, the specialization of Germany in the automobile industry is likely related to the invention of the first vehicle powered by an internal combustion engine in Germany 1885 and the resulting early adoption of cars.²² We argue that, while related to the importance of the car industry in Germany nowadays, the large adoption of cars in Germany in the early 1900s is plausibly *exogenous* to the cross-border acquisition activity of German car manufacturers during the 1990-2010 period.

The construction of our instrument is based on cross-country technology adoption data from CHAT dataset compiled by Comin and Hobijn (2009).²³ We focus on nine major innovations (car, telephone, radio, loom, newspaper, plane, ship, train, and electric power) that can be unambiguously linked to the modern industry definitions we use in our sample. We compute the adoption rate of each technology for each country in the first part of the twentieth century and link these innovations to 23 distinct industries using the correspondence presented in the Internet Appendix.²⁴ For instance, we link the “car” technology to the “manufacture of motor vehicles”, the “sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicle”, and the “renting of transport equipment” industries. In order to make historical adoption rates comparable across innovations and countries, we standardize all rates by their sample standard deviation. For each industry i (of the 23 industries), we then compute the difference in historical adoption rates between two countries c and c' ($\Delta Adoption_{c,c',i}$), and use this variable to instrument the difference in specialization in industry i between these countries ($\Delta SP_{c,c',i}$).²⁵

[Insert Table 7 Here]

²²Comin and Hobijn (2010) indicate that the first car was invented by Gottlieb Daimler in 1885.

²³Available at <http://www.nber.org/data/chat/>

²⁴Because of data availability, we compute the adoption rate at different points in time so as to have enough cross-country variation in adoption rates far back in the past. The years of measurement vary between 1900 (for ships and rail) and 1963 (for loom). Also, the country coverage varies for each innovation.

²⁵The use of historical variables to instrument present-day variables is widespread in economics, see for instance Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Glaeser and Shleifer (2002), or Becker and Woessmann (2009)

Panel A of Table 7 presents the results from the IV estimations of the baseline model (2) by ordinary least squares. First, the first-stage estimates confirm that differences in historical adoption rates of innovations positively predict differences in industry specialization across countries beyond the effect of the control variables (e.g. country levels of economic development). The estimates also indicate that our instrument is not weak as the t -statistics are 9.42 and 13.83, respectively. Second, the second-stage estimates confirm the positive effect of specialization on cross-border acquisition activity as the estimated coefficients on ΔSP are all positive and significant. In a similar spirit, we re-estimate for the whole sample our baseline equation (2) but measure differences in specialization over the 1990-1995 period and use it to explain deal activity over the 2006-2010 period. The effect of specialization continues to be strong and significant.

To investigate the potential effect of omitted variables, we take advantage of the panel structure of the sample. Introducing the time dimension in the baseline equation (2) allows us to include industry-country-pair fixed effects, and hence capture any fixed difference across industry-country-pairs. By doing so, the coefficient of interest (β) in equation (2) measures how the volume of acquisitions in a given industry-country-pair changes when the difference in specialization ($\Delta SP_{c,c',i,t}$) changes. However, estimated on the full panel sample, the model expands to more than 3.6 million observations ($46 \times 45 \times 85 \times 21$). With only 36,105 horizontal acquisitions during the sample period, the number of zeros in the dependent variable inflate to more than 99% of the sample, pushing the unconditional deal incidence in a given year-industry-country pair close to zero. For this reason, we report in Table 8 the results obtained from the full panel of 21 years as well as an aggregation of three sub-periods of seven years where we average the dependent and independent variables across each sub-period.

[Insert Table 8 Here]

Our conclusions continue to hold when we control for unobserved differences between industry-country pairs (together with country-level controls). When we focus

on the three-period aggregation (Panel A), the estimated coefficients on ΔSP are all positive and significant. Albeit smaller, the economic magnitude of the specialization effect remains substantial. When the difference in specialization in a given country-industry-pair increases by one standard-deviation, we observe an increase of about 1.1% (1% and 1.2%) in the number of deals in this pair and a 9% (7.4% and 10.5%) increase in acquisition value.²⁶ Taken together, our findings are resilient to the use of an instrumental variable approach and the inclusion of industry-country-pair fixed effects.

D Alternative Explanations and Robustness

D.1 Differences in Industry Characteristics

By design, the inclusion of acquirer and target country characteristics in the baseline specification (2) guarantees that the effect of specialization is not capturing differences between countries, such as different quality of institutions, openness, financial or economic development. Yet, differences in specialization could be correlated with several industry characteristics that are known to influence cross-border acquisitions.²⁷

First, it is also possible that part of the industry specialization advantage is related to the absolute weight of an industry in a given country rather than its weight relative to the world average. Thus, differences in firms' size, or the number of firms between the acquiring and target industry could be related to differences in specialization patterns and also transaction intensity. Relatedly, specialization could be linked to value of

²⁶The smaller economic magnitude is somewhat expected as the source of variation in these panel specifications is within industry-country pairs as opposed to between industry-country pairs in our baseline (cross-sectional) estimation. The significance of ΔSP is further remarkable as industry specialization is highly persistent across countries and industries. The autocorrelation estimates are 0.92 for $SP(sales)$ and 0.87 for $SP(emp)$. In the Internet Appendix, we report results using OLS as (non-linear) Tobit estimations with a large number of fixed effects could be inefficient and biased. The results are qualitatively similar.

²⁷Note that we cannot address the issue of industry size by including acquirer and target country-industry fixed effects because our measure of bilateral specialization is symmetric, in the sense that for a given industry i , the difference in specialization between the acquiring country c and the target country c' , labeled as $\Delta SP_{c,c',i}$ is equal to $-1 \times \Delta SP_{c',c,i}$. This implies that acquirer and target country-industry fixed effects ($\alpha_{c,i}$ and $\alpha_{c',i}$) are collinear with $\Delta SP_{c,c',i}$. Yet, the inclusion of country-industry-pair fixed effects in the panel specification partially addresses this concern.

growth opportunities or access to financing, both of which could explain international acquisitions.²⁸ To assess whether our interpretation is threatened by such alternative explanations, we construct country-industry variables using firm-level observations. Specifically, we measure size using the (log of the) sum of firms’ assets as well the number of firms in each country-industry. We use the average firm market-to-book ratio in each country-industry to capture industry valuation, and the average firm cash-to-asset ratio to measure access to funds. These measures are computed as averages over the sample period. Because some country-industry observations do not feature any publicly listed company in Worldscope, we are able to measure these variables for about half of all industry-country pairs.

[Insert Table 9 Here]

Columns 1 to 4 of Table 9 indicates that the effect of specialization remains when we control for differences of size, valuation, and access to finance between the acquirer and target country-industries. Our main variable of interest ΔSP continues to be positive and strongly significant in all four specifications.²⁹ Reflecting that part of the specialization effect is related to differences in valuation, size, and firm count, the economic significance slightly decreases (by about 40%) but remains substantial and strongly significant.

In columns 5 to 8, we further control for differences in country-industry “global market shares” (ΔGMS) to alternatively capture industries’ global economic importance. We define the market share of a given country-industry-year as the ratio of its sales (or employment) to worldwide sales (employment) in that industry, based on Worldscope. As with the specialization measures, we assign a value of zero to country-industries with no publicly listed firms, and aggregate this measure over the whole sample period. Confirming the results of columns 1 to 4, we observe more deals between two countries in a given industry when the acquirer industry has larger market shares than

²⁸See for instance Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2012) or Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) for the role of valuation in cross-border acquisitions, and Alquist, Mukherjee, and Tesar (2014) for the role of access to finance.

²⁹For brevity we only report the coefficients on ΔSP .

the target industry as the coefficient on ΔGMS is positive and significant. Yet, the effect of specialization continues to be large and strong. In all, the results in Table 9 largely dispel concerns that differences in absolute economic importance, valuation and access to finance between industries explain the specialization effect.

D.2 Product Market Competition

In Table 10 we consider the role of product market competition. Caves (1971) argues that imperfect competition, in particular the possession of differentiated products, is an important determinant in international acquisitions as it shields the acquirer from competitive pressure in the foreign market. Similarly, Neary (2007) predicts that firms are less likely to target assets overseas in more competitive industries. In his model, firms make acquisitions in order to limit competition in the industry in which they hold an advantage. The smaller the number of competitors, the larger will be the increase in market share for the remaining firms if one of the competitors is taken over. Thus, Neary (2007) specifically predicts that the less competition in a given industry, the more likely firms will be to enter overseas markets through acquisitions. Overall, as product market competition in a particular country-industry could be related to the degree of specialization, we evaluate the effect of competition on our conclusions.

We measure the intensity of product market competition in target industries using the Lerner Index, or price-cost margin, following Nickell (1996). The price-cost margin we use is operating profits divided by sales (from Worldscope). We measure competition in a given country-industry-year as one minus the average price-cost margin.³⁰ Table 10 reports the results. Panel A reveals that, all else equal, the intensity of international acquisitions is significantly lower in competitive target industries. Estimates on the measures of competition in target country-industry are negative and significant. This

³⁰A value of one indicates perfect competition (price equal marginal cost) while values below one indicate some degree of market power. As explained by Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005), one advantage of the Lerner Index is that it does not rely on any particular definition of geographic markets (unlike other indicators such as the Hirschman-Herfindahl index). This is particularly relevant in our setting as multinational firms operate in global markets.

is true for both measures of acquisition flows (in number and value) and for both measures of specialization. While intense competition in the product market appears to dampen foreign acquisitions, the effect of specialization on acquisition flows remains positive and substantial.

[Insert Table 10 Here]

To further understand the interplay between specialization and competition, we interact the difference in specialization between the acquirer and target industry (ΔSP) with the intensity of competition of the target industry. Results are presented in Panel B. The interactive effect is positive and significant across all specifications, indicating that the specialization effect we document above partly mitigates the competitive effect. The flow of acquisition is markedly larger when the difference in specialization is large and the target industry is more competitive, consistent with the advantage of specialized buyers allowing them to withstand the effects of competitive pressure in foreign markets.

D.3 Differences in Economic Development

While the inclusion of country variables in our specification captures the potential effect heterogeneous development on the specialization effect, one might be concerned that this effect is concentrated in firms from developed markets acquiring firms in emerging markets as in Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar (2010). Table 11 indicates that this is not the case. We estimate our baseline specification(2) separately for four distinct partitions based on the classification of countries into developed markets (DM) and emerging markets (EM) from the Standard and Poor’s Emerging Market Database (in 1998). The coefficients on (ΔSP) are positive in every partition. The specialization effect is prevalent for transactions involving firms coming from both developed and emerging markets acquiring assets in both developed and emerging markets.

[Insert Table 11 Here]

D.4 Additional Robustness Tests

We perform additional analyses to verify the robustness of our findings that we report (together with other ancillary tests discussed in the text) in an Internet Appendix. These additional tests are built around the cross-sectional specifications of cross-border horizontal acquisition flows (equation (2)). With respect to the cross-sectional results reported in Table 5, we first estimate the baseline equation using OLS, a count model and the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML) method developed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) to capture the count nature of the dependent variables (in the presence of many zeros).³¹ Second, we include acquirer and target country fixed effects instead of country level control variables. Third, we add differences between acquirer and target country variables instead of levels. Fourth, we scale the flow (both in number and value) of cross-border horizontal acquisitions in a given industry between two countries by the intensity of domestic horizontal acquisition in the target industry. Fifth, we exclude observations from the U.S. and the U.K. as these two countries account for a non-trivial fraction of all transactions and estimate the baseline models across all country-pairs separately. Sixth, we replace our baseline measure of specialization with one that exclude sales realized abroad. Seventh, we estimate the baseline models separately for tradable and non-tradable sectors and find no significant differences (although the effect of specialization is larger in non-tradable sectors). Finally, we consider separately mergers and acquisition of assets, as well as distinct types of cross-border deals based on the public status of the acquiring and target firms. Overall, our findings are robust to these alternative estimations and specifications.

E Deal-level Evidence

To provide a different perspective on the role of specialization in cross-border acquisitions, we estimate selection models at the deal-level that predict the probability for

³¹This estimation is performed using the `ppml` command available in Stata. Further details are available here: <http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/jmcss/LGW.html>

a firm in a given country-industry to become an acquirer or a target in a cross-border horizontal transaction. We run conditional logit regressions where the dependent variable $Deal_{c,i,m,t}$ is equal to one if the target firm (acquiring firm) in a given deal m is from country c and industry i . For each deal, the specification includes one observation for the actual country-industry of the target (acquirer), and multiple similar control observations that could have been potential targets (acquirers) in deal m .

We construct the control sample as follows. For each target (acquirer) of a deal that occurred in year t , we select five country-industry observations corresponding to the same industry as the actual target (acquirer), but located in *different* countries. We pick these observations from the pool of target (acquirer) country-industry-year observations that feature at least one cross-border transaction, and select the five closest observations in terms of the number of transactions.³² The explanatory variables in our conditional logit models include the targets' (acquirers') measure of specialization SP , country characteristics (similar as in the baseline specification (2)), and deal fixed effects for each target (acquirer) and its controls.

[Insert Table 12 Here]

The first two columns of Table 12 presents coefficient estimates from the conditional logit model that predict targets. The estimated coefficient on SP are negative and significant at the 1% level for both measures of specialization. In line with the above regression results, targets are significantly less likely to be chosen from countries with a higher degree of industry specialization compared to other countries with a similar level of (target side) deal activity in cross-border transactions. Columns 3 and 4 report results relative to the probability of becoming acquirers. We observe positive and significant estimates for SP in both columns, indicating that acquirers in cross-border horizontal deals are more likely to come from country-industries that exhibit a higher

³²We match on transaction volume because we showed earlier that participation in cross-border transactions and industry specialization are correlated. As a result, our selection model could produce biased results if we did not limit the set of possible target countries to those with comparable deal activity.

level of specialization.³³

V Human and Technological Capital

Cross-border acquisitions are driven by relative advantages that originate in localized specific assets, that we capture using differences in specialization across countries and industries. As these specialized assets should be (1) mobile, and (2) difficult to contract upon or replicate by outsiders, they are likely to be intangible. This section examines whether this explanation can help explain the importance of industry specialization. First, we examine measures of human and technological capital at the country-level and test whether the effect of industry specialization on cross-border acquisition flows is stronger when the acquirer country benefits from a larger stock of intangible capital compared to that of the target country. Second, we use disaggregated data on human and technological capital at the level of industries, and directly test if differences in intangibles between country-industries explain the intensity of cross-border acquisitions.

A Human Capital

We first consider human capital. We rely on two measures of country-level education as proxies for the stock of human capital. First, following Barro and Lee (2013) we consider the fraction of the population that obtains a higher (tertiary) education. Second, we use the fraction of public spending on education (to total public spending). To assess the role of these two variables on the acquisition-specialization sensitivity, we partition the sample in two sub-samples based on the median of the country-pair differences. Accordingly, we assign to the “High” partition the country pairs where the difference in education proxies (between the acquirer and the target country) are above

³³Unreported results indicate that these results continue to hold if we further control for the size and growth opportunities of the target industries or acquirer industries.

the median, and to the “Low” partition the pairs that are below the median.³⁴ We then estimate the baseline specification (2) separately for each partition and compare the estimated coefficients across partitions.

[Insert Table 13 Here]

Table 13 reports the results of the cross-country-pairs estimations. For brevity we only display the coefficients for ΔSP as well as the p -value of the test that assesses whether ΔSP is significantly larger in the “High” partition than in the “Low” partition. In support of our hypothesis, we observe that the link between specialization and cross-border horizontal acquisitions is larger in the “High” partition than in the “Low” partition. This pattern emerges in all specifications. The differences across partitions are both statistically and economically significant. The effect of specialization on acquisition intensity is roughly two times larger when the acquirer country benefits from a large share of highly educated people in its population relative to the target country. In the same vein, the effect of specialization is about 40% larger when there is a large difference in the spending on education between acquirer and target country.

B Technological Capital

Next, we investigate whether the effect of specialization on global acquisition flows also varies with countries’ stock of technological capital. Our hypothesis implies that the benefit for firms to extend their local specialization overseas should be positively related to their country’s technological advancement.

We use various measures of technology advancement at the country-level as proxies for the stock of technological capital. First, we measure the importance of technology and innovation by using the ratio of (public and private) R&D spending to GDP. Second, following Adams (1990) we measure the stock of technological knowledge with the number of patents per capita, the number of trademark per capita, and the number

³⁴Note that because partitioning variables are differences at the country-pair level, the values of the median are zero by construction. Hence, the “High” and “Low” partition capture positive and respectively negative differences in the partitioning variables.

of scientific articles per capita. We again assign each country-pair into a “High” or a “Low” partition based on the median country-pair differences of each variable. Table 14 presents the results of the cross-partition estimations.

[Insert Table 14 Here]

We observe notable differences between the “High” and “Low” partitions. Across all specifications, the acquisition-specialization sensitivity is markedly larger when the acquirer country enjoys a larger stock of technological capital relative to the acquirer country (the “High” partitions). The contrasts are economically important as coefficient estimates are almost 50% larger in the “High” partitions. Moreover, the differences across partitions are statistically significant in 12 out of the 16 estimations. Overall, the flow of horizontal cross-border acquisitions from more specialized to less specialized industries increases even more when country pairs exhibit larger differences in technological capital.

C Industry Intangibles

Alternatively, we use more granular measures of human and technological capital at the level of industries for a subset of countries to directly examine whether differences in intangibles between country-industry observations are related to acquisitions intensity. Data comes from the EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts (KLEMS).³⁵ This database contains industry-level measures of output, inputs and productivity for 25 European countries, as well as the US, Japan, Korea and Australia for the period from 1970 onwards. We rely on two variables to measure the stock of human capital. We measure human capital using the ratio of high-skilled labor compensation to total compensation, and the ratio of hours worked by high-skilled persons engaged to total hours worked. We average these variables for each available country and industry over our sample period, which represent 73,665 country-industry observations (22 countries

³⁵See O’Mahony and Timmer (2009) for a description of the KLEMS dataset.

and 85 industries).³⁶

We rely on four variables as proxies for the stock of technological capital at the industry level. From the same source, we use the stock of software capital as well as the stock of computing and communication equipment (both measured in 1995 prices). We have 43,290 non-missing country-industry observations (or 11,544 non-missing industry-country pair observations). In addition, we aggregate firm-level data on R&D expenditures from Worldscope to compute the stock of R&D capital (using the perpetual inventory method as detailed in Falato, Kadyrzhanova, and Sim (2014)) and the intensity of R&D expenses (R&D over assets) for each available country-industry observation (123,165 country-industry observations).

[Insert Table 15 Here]

Table 15 reports cross-sectional tobit estimations similar to those of the baseline specification 2 but where we replace the difference in specialization (ΔSP) in a given industry between country pairs with differences in human and technology capital (that we label $\Delta Intangibles$). We observe positive and significant coefficients for the measures of human capital, indicating that there are more horizontal transactions between two countries (in a given industry) when the acquiring industry has a larger stock of human capital than the target industry. We also observe positive coefficients for three out of four measures of technological capital. All else equal, acquisition intensity is stronger when the acquiring industry benefits from larger stocks of software assets or R&D capital. Although limited to a subset of industry-country pairs, these results lend further support for the idea that the intensity of cross-border acquisitions is related to differences in intangible assets across countries and industries.

³⁶The KLEMS dataset contains data at the level of 32 industries. We manually map the three-digit ISIC code we use throughout the paper to the KLEMS industries.

VI Ex Post Performance

In this section, we examine whether ex post acquisition outcomes depend on the specialization profile of both the acquirers and targets. An important obstacle to measuring ex post acquisition performance is that two separate firms exist before the transaction, and one or two firms might exist after the transaction, depending on the transaction type. As in Hoberg and Phillips (2012) we avoid this issue by considering only the ex post change in performance of acquirers, measured relative to the first set of numbers available after the transaction effective date. We thus implicitly assume that performance accrues over time as it takes time for specialized acquirers to deploy their intangible assets on newly purchased foreign assets.³⁷

We examine changes in operating income over assets from year $t + 1$ to year $t + 2$, or $t + 4$ (one- and three-years horizons). As information on performance is available only for public companies, we focus on public firms acquiring public or private targets in horizontal cross-border transactions. To isolate the effect of specialization differences on post-acquisition performance, we restrict our attention to firms that only acquire assets in cross-border horizontal transactions over the horizons we consider. Moreover, because changes in performance can reflect underlying industry trends, we benchmark acquirers' performance by contrasting it to that of matched industry peers. For each acquirer, we select the closest peer (by size) that (1) operates in the same country and industry, and (2) that is not involved in any acquisition during a six-year window surrounding the transaction.³⁸

[Insert Table 16 Here]

Table 16 reports the results of OLS regressions where the ex post changes in performance (at different horizons) are the dependent variables. The sample includes 4,997 acquisitions made by 3,636 distinct firms from 46 countries and 84 industries.

³⁷Note that by examining post-changes only we bias our analysis towards not finding results due to a reduction in power, but we avoid complications of measuring performance in year $t - 1$.

³⁸To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorize the performance measures at the 1% level. Moreover, to reduce survivorship issues, we assign any missing values for a given horizon the value of the last known horizon (as in Hoberg and Phillips (2012)).

All specifications include control variables as well as country-pairs, industry, and year fixed effects. We observe that the estimated coefficients for ΔSP are positive across all performance horizons and with both measures of specialization. They are significant in all four specifications. Thus, acquisitions where acquirers are more specialized than targets appear to be associated with increased ex post profitability. The results are economically substantial. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in $\Delta SP(sales)$ is associated with an increase in profitability of 0.60% over one year, and the same level of 0.60% is maintained over three years.

We recognize that looking at acquirers' ex post outcomes does not necessarily identify the (causal) effects of cross-border transactions on firm performance.³⁹ Our analysis indicates, however, that differences in specialization between acquirers and targets are associated with better operating performance. Consistent with our main hypothesis, this finding suggests that the benefits of extending specialization abroad arise because of the enhanced ability of specialized buyers to operate the acquired assets more efficiently.

VII Conclusions

We examine whether industry specialization and industry-specific intangibles are important in explaining the flow and direction of cross-border acquisitions. Our central hypothesis is that some of the resource advantages arising from industry specialization are knowledge-based and hence mobile, and can help to explain cross-border acquisition flows. We find strong empirical support for this hypothesis, focusing on a large sample of horizontal transactions involving 46 countries and 85 industries.

We find large differences in the degree of industry specialization between acquirers and targets. For a given industry, the larger the difference in specialization between two countries, the larger is the flow of bilateral acquisitions (both in numbers and

³⁹Indeed, our results could be explained by a selection story where more specialized buyers are better able to find valuable foreign assets, that lead to post-transaction increased in performance.

dollar value). The direction of acquisitions goes from acquirers in industries in which their home country is more specialized buying targets in countries where that industry is less specialized. The magnitude of the specialization effect is large.

We further show that the effect of specialization on the intensity of cross-border acquisitions is related to measures of intangibles. We estimate that the specialization effect is stronger when the acquirer countries have higher educational attainment, spend more on R&D, and enjoy larger stocks of patents or trademarks. At the country-industry level we find that industry specialization and country-industry agglomeration plays a larger role when the acquirer comes from a industry-country pair with higher measures of human and technological capital - including R&D, the fraction of highly skilled workers and the stock of information and communication technology - than the industry of the target country.

We conclude that the distribution of specialization across countries and industries is important in explaining the geography of global acquisitions, consistent with firms extending specialized intangibles overseas via foreign acquisitions. Our findings support the proposition that the existence and prevalence of specialized assets such as human capital and intellectual capital are important factors in understanding firms' international expansion.

Appendix 1: Definition of the Variables

#Acq.: Number of cross-border horizontal acquisitions between two countries in a given industry (Source: SDC)

\$Acq.: Dollar value of cross-border horizontal acquisitions between two countries in a given industry (Source: SDC)

SP(sales): Degree of specialization of an industry in a given country, computed as the share of the industry's sales in its country total sales, divided by the average share of sales in the industry across all countries, aggregated across public firms in each country-industry (Source: Worldscope and own calculations).

SP(emp): Degree of specialization of an industry in a given country, computed as the share of the industry's employment in its country total employment, divided by the average share of employment in the industry across all countries, aggregated across public firms in each country-industry (Source: Worldscope and own calculations).

GDP/capita: Gross domestic product per capita (Source: Worldbank)

Trade: Bilateral imports and exports (Source: World Integration Trade Solution (WITS))

%Tertiary Education: Fraction of the labor force with a tertiary education (Source Barro-Lee Educational Attainment Dataset).

%Education Spending: Fraction of public spending on education (Source Barro-Lee Educational Attainment Dataset).

#Patents/capita: Number of deposited patents per capita (Source: Worldbank)

#Trademarks/capita: Number of trademarks per capita (Source: Worldbank)

#Articles/capita: Number of scientific articles per capita (Source: Worldbank)

Exchange rate return: Difference in the logarithm of the monthly real exchange rate (Source: Datastream)

Distance: Geographic distance between capitals, calculated using the great circle formula and latitudes and longitudes of the capital or most populous city (Source: CEPII).

Common Border: Dummy that equals one if two countries share a common border (Source: CEPII).

Same Religion: Dummy that equals one if two countries share the same religion, defined as the dominant religion of a country (Source: CIA World Factbook 2008).

Same Language: Dummy that equals one if two countries share the same language, defined as the primary spoken language of a country (Source: CIA World Factbook 2008).

Same Legal System: Dummy that equals one if two countries share the same legal system (Common, Civil, German, or Scandinavian) (Source: Djankov et al. 2006).

Corporate Tax Rate: Country corporate tax rate (Source: Economic Freedom Index).

Double-Tax Treaty: Dummy that equals one if two countries have signed a double-taxation treaty (Source: UNCTAD).

Bilateral Investment Treaty: Dummy that equals one if two countries have signed bilat-

eral investment treaty (Source: UNCTAD).

Total Assets: Total Assets (Source: Worldscope)

Market-to-book: Book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity, divided by the book value of assets (Source: Worldscope).

GMS(sales): Global market shares of an industry in a given country, computed as the share of the country-industry's sales in the global industry's sales, aggregated across public firms in each country-industry (Source: Worldscope and own calculations).

GMS(emp): Global market shares of an industry in a given country, computed as the share of the country-industry's employment in the global industry's sales, aggregated across public firms in each country-industry (Source: Worldscope and own calculations).

1-Lerner: Measure of product market competition computed as one minus the average price-cost margin ratio in an industry, where the price-cost margin is computed as operating profits before depreciation and amortization over sales (Source: Worldscope)

OI/A: Operating income divided by total assets (Source: Worldscope)

R&D Stock: Stock of R&D capital computed using the perpetual inventory method $G_{i,t} = (1 - \delta)G_{i,t-1} + R\&D_{i,t}$, where $G_{i,t}$ is the end-of-period stock of R&D capital for firm i and δ is the depreciation rate of R&D capital set to 15% as in Falato, Kadyrzhanova, and Sim (2014) (Source: Worldscope)

R&D/Assets: Ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets (Source: Worldscope)

High Skill (%comp): (country-industry) ratio of high-skilled labor compensation to total compensation (Source: EU KLEMS variable *LABHS*)

High Skill (%hours): (country-industry) ratio of hours worked by high-skilled persons engaged to total hours worked (Source: EU KLEMS variable *H-HS*)

Software (%capital): (country-industry) stock of software capital over total capital, in 1995 prices (Source: EU KLEMS variable *K-Soft*)

ICT Stock (%capital): (country-industry) stock of computing and communication equipment of total capital, in 1995 prices (Source: EU KLEMS variable *K-ICT*)

Appendix 2: Mapping between ISIC and SIC

Our various data sources are based on different industry classifications, notably the US Standard Industrial Classification (SIC 1987) classification and the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC Rev. 3) classification. To make the industry classification systems compatible, we define industries as the finest possible partition of industries in the 3-digit ISIC Rev. 3 system such that the 3-digit SIC 1987 classification is a refinement of this partition; that is, none of the 3-digit industries in the SIC 1987 has an intersection with two or more industries in the partition of industries we define. This yields a partition of 101 industries. Existing concordances between ISIC and SIC classifications do not exclude overlap, i.e. individual 3-digit SIC industries corresponding to more than one 3-digit ISIC industries, and vice versa.

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Table 1: Measures of Specialization – Descriptive Statistics

This table presents descriptive statistics for our two main measures of industry specialization as presented in Section II.A. $SP(sales)$ is specialization based on total sales, and $SP(emp)$ is specialization based on total employment. Data on sales and employment are from Worldscope. The sample covers 46 countries, 85 distinct industries and the period 1990-2010. Industries are defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). Panel A displays aggregate summary statistics (average, median as well as 10th and 90th percentiles) for each country. Panel B displays the two most specialized industries (highest $SP(sales)$) for each country aggregated over the whole sample period.

Panel A Country	$SP(sales)$				$SP(emp)$			
	Average	10 th	Median	90 th	Average	10 th	Median	90 th
Argentina	0.51	0.00	0.00	0.78	0.34	0.00	0.00	0.00
Australia	1.38	0.00	0.29	4.19	1.22	0.00	0.10	3.42
Austria	0.76	0.00	0.00	1.99	0.81	0.00	0.00	2.56
Belgium	0.88	0.00	0.00	2.50	1.02	0.00	0.00	2.73
Brazil	0.51	0.00	0.08	1.50	0.67	0.00	0.00	2.10
Canada	1.26	0.00	0.42	3.03	1.08	0.00	0.22	2.90
Chile	0.75	0.00	0.00	2.26	0.79	0.00	0.00	2.50
China	1.08	0.00	0.35	2.49	1.11	0.00	0.28	2.65
Colombia	0.58	0.00	0.00	1.87	0.59	0.00	0.00	1.35
Czech Republic	0.39	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.41	0.00	0.00	0.55
Denmark	0.87	0.00	0.01	2.51	0.91	0.00	0.01	2.78
Finland	1.00	0.00	0.04	2.45	1.10	0.00	0.04	2.61
France	1.37	0.00	0.59	3.64	1.51	0.00	0.57	3.76
Germany	1.50	0.00	0.31	3.24	1.47	0.00	0.31	3.31
Greece	0.75	0.00	0.11	2.27	0.74	0.00	0.03	2.22
Hong Kong	1.38	0.00	0.51	3.11	1.34	0.00	0.27	3.77
Hungary	0.53	0.00	0.00	0.78	0.58	0.00	0.00	0.91
India	0.96	0.00	0.23	2.71	0.74	0.00	0.00	2.00
Indonesia	1.03	0.00	0.12	2.79	1.02	0.00	0.00	2.37
Ireland	0.72	0.00	0.00	2.13	0.73	0.00	0.00	2.06
Israel	0.80	0.00	0.00	2.06	0.61	0.00	0.00	1.80
Italy	0.68	0.00	0.09	2.09	0.76	0.00	0.11	2.31
Japan	2.02	0.08	0.91	6.10	2.00	0.10	0.66	5.74
Korea	1.37	0.00	0.40	3.77	1.34	0.00	0.47	3.14
Luxemburg	0.60	0.00	0.00	0.38	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.14
Malaysia	1.22	0.00	0.55	3.55	1.10	0.00	0.03	3.32
Mexico	0.94	0.00	0.00	2.94	0.76	0.00	0.00	2.20
Netherlands	0.99	0.00	0.15	2.26	1.26	0.00	0.14	2.82
New Zealand	1.15	0.00	0.00	3.18	0.92	0.00	0.00	1.40
Norway	1.14	0.00	0.00	1.90	1.49	0.00	0.00	2.55
Peru	0.54	0.00	0.00	1.75	0.40	0.00	0.00	1.18
Philippines	0.75	0.00	0.00	2.11	0.67	0.00	0.00	1.56
Poland	0.71	0.00	0.00	2.01	0.65	0.00	0.00	1.69
Portugal	0.54	0.00	0.00	1.52	0.54	0.00	0.00	1.60
Russia	0.44	0.00	0.00	0.66	0.40	0.00	0.00	0.87
Singapore	1.70	0.00	0.55	4.21	1.41	0.00	0.00	4.20
South Africa	1.28	0.00	0.28	3.56	1.29	0.00	0.17	3.31
Spain	0.74	0.00	0.00	1.83	0.79	0.00	0.00	1.93
Sweden	1.18	0.00	0.21	3.64	1.11	0.00	0.16	3.08
Switzerland	1.81	0.00	0.14	4.30	1.99	0.00	0.13	3.30
Taiwan	1.49	0.00	0.22	4.06	1.38	0.00	0.08	3.31
Thailand	0.97	0.00	0.34	2.63	1.23	0.00	0.07	3.28
Turkey	0.86	0.00	0.00	2.00	0.82	0.00	0.00	2.02
UK	1.46	0.02	0.67	3.03	1.81	0.03	0.65	3.94
USA	2.26	0.17	1.20	4.98	2.42	0.16	1.00	5.94
Venezuela	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.18	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.00
World	1.00	0.00	0.06	2.64	1.00	0.00	0.00	2.55

<i>Panel B</i>	Top#1	Top#2
Argentina	Manufacture of footwear	Basic iron and steel
Australia	Repair of personal and household goods	Advertising
Austria	Architectural, engineering and others	Other wholesale
Belgium	Insurance and pension funding	Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco
Brazil	Education	Retail trade in specialized stores
Canada	Repair of personal and household goods	Printing and service activities
Chile	Education	Sea and coastal water transport of freight
China	Non-scheduled air transport	Education
Colombia	Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles	Beverages
Czech Republic	Tobacco products	Casting of metals
Denmark	Sea and coastal water transport of freight	Sea and coastal water transport of passengers
Finland	Television and radio transmitters	Paper and paper products
France	Electric lamps and lighting equipment	Tanning and dressing of leather
Germany	Retail trade not in stores	Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles
Greece	Human health activities	Precious and non-ferrous metals
Hong Kong	Sea and coastal water transport of passengers	Education
Hungary	Plastics products	Refined petroleum products
India	Electric lamps and lighting equipment	Education
Indonesia	Tobacco products	Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles
Ireland	General purpose machinery	Dairy products
Israel	Insurance and pension funding	Architectural and engineering activities
Italy	Aircraft and spacecraft	Motor vehicle and equipment
Japan	Accumulators, primary cells, primary batteries	Electrical equipment
Korea	Television and radio receivers	Other wholesale
Luxemburg	Structural metal products, tanks, reservoirs	Basic iron and steel
Malaysia	Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles	Hotels and accommodation
Mexico	Glass and glass products	Restaurants, bars and canteens
Netherlands	Renting of construction or demolition equipment	Meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, oils and fats
New Zealand	Renting of transport equipment	Legal, accounting, and auditing activities
Norway	Oil and gas extraction	Non-scheduled air transport
Peru	Grain mill products and starched products	Legal, accounting, and auditing activities
Philippines	Education	Beverages
Poland	Renting of construction or demolition equipment	Wearing apparel, except fur apparel
Portugal	Products of wood, cork, and straw	Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco
Russia	Transport via pipelines	Railway and tramway locomotives
Singapore	Building and repairing of ships and boats	Electronic valves and tubes
South Africa	Railway and tramway locomotives	Chemical and Fertilizer Minerals
Spain	Railway and tramway locomotives	Repair of personal and household goods
Sweden	Domestic appliances	Wearing apparel, except fur apparel
Switzerland	Watches and clocks	Electricity distribution, wire and cable
Taiwan	Office, accounting and computing machines	Casting of metals
Thailand	Miscellaneous Manufactures	Manufacture of footwear
Turkey	Domestic appliances	Glass and glass products
UK	Legal, accounting, and auditing activities	Advertising
USA	Renting of transport equipment	Education
Venezuela	Structural metal products, tanks, and reservoirs	Monetary intermediation

Table 2: Mergers and Acquisitions - Descriptive Statistics

This table describes the sample of mergers and acquisitions. Data are from SDC Platinum M&A Database. We include mergers and acquisitions where more than 50% of the target shares are owned by the acquirer after the transaction. We exclude LBOs, spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tender offers, exchange offers, repurchases, acquisitions of remaining interests, privatizations as well as deals involving government agencies. The sample period is 1990-2010. Panel A displays the breakdown of transactions across domestic, cross-border, horizontal and non-horizontal for the whole sample. Panel B displays the number of transactions (N), the dollar value of transactions (V in \$bn), the fraction of cross-border transactions (C), the fraction of horizontal transactions (H) and the fraction of cross-border horizontal transactions (C&H) separately for each acquirer and target country. Industries are defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2).

<i>Panel A</i>	Total	Domestic	Cross-Border
Number of deals	365,496 (100%)	284,357 (77.80%)	81,139 (22.20%)
Value of deals (in Billion)	\$21,612 (100%)	\$15,694 (72.60%)	\$5,918 (27.40%)
Number of Horizontal Deals	162,098 (44.60%)	125,993 (44.70%)	36,105 (44.50%)
Number of Non-Horizontal Deals	203,398 (55.40%)	158,364 (55.30%)	55,034 (55.50%)

Panel B	Acquirer Country					Target Country				
	N	V (\$bn)	C	H	C&H	N	V (\$bn)	C	H	C&H
Argentina	756	51	15%	50%	9%	1,443	73	56%	53%	32%
Australia	11,560	461	17%	42%	7%	12,412	419	22%	43%	10%
Austria	2,073	37	50%	47%	25%	1,976	47	48%	45%	23%
Belgium	2,913	155	51%	46%	24%	2,940	95	51%	46%	25%
Brazil	2,343	163	9%	55%	5%	3,515	241	39%	52%	19%
Canada	13,497	565	31%	47%	15%	13,537	532	31%	45%	14%
Chile	483	17	23%	51%	14%	716	30	48%	51%	26%
China	6,240	156	10%	35%	4%	8,540	255	34%	36%	14%
Colombia	180	7	32%	65%	23%	324	22	62%	60%	37%
Czech Republic	766	5	9%	43%	4%	1,488	32	53%	47%	27%
Denmark	3,326	77	37%	47%	18%	3,394	81	39%	47%	19%
Finland	4,695	112	26%	43%	11%	4,664	95	26%	43%	11%
France	16,725	1025	29%	45%	15%	17,055	817	30%	43%	13%
Germany	19,478	839	29%	45%	14%	20,754	947	34%	43%	14%
Greece	941	27	19%	47%	9%	945	31	19%	48%	10%
Hong Kong	5,862	320	39%	36%	13%	5,344	250	33%	38%	12%
Hungary	771	3	9%	37%	5%	1,370	20	49%	43%	25%
India	4,371	87	19%	39%	11%	5,079	121	30%	37%	13%
Indonesia	594	25	14%	41%	4%	996	36	49%	45%	23%
Ireland	2,045	77	58%	43%	26%	1,736	53	50%	44%	24%
Israel	1,117	60	44%	40%	22%	1,154	51	46%	39%	22%
Italy	6,604	426	25%	44%	13%	7,527	459	34%	41%	14%
Japan	17,926	700	14%	38%	5%	16,527	642	7%	38%	3%
Korea	3,145	201	12%	28%	5%	3,404	221	19%	30%	8%
Luxemburg	701	64	92%	40%	35%	328	76	83%	46%	37%
Malaysia	7,169	94	13%	34%	5%	6,946	92	11%	35%	4%
Mexico	825	149	33%	49%	19%	1,417	160	61%	49%	31%
Netherlands	7,737	434	48%	44%	22%	6,526	423	39%	43%	17%
New Zealand	2,042	35	20%	44%	8%	2,557	52	36%	42%	14%
Norway	3,053	81	35%	48%	18%	3,150	99	37%	47%	18%
Peru	166	7	11%	41%	6%	290	15	49%	49%	29%
Philippines	569	15	13%	41%	5%	827	29	40%	43%	18%
Poland	1,337	16	8%	43%	4%	2,323	43	47%	45%	23%
Portugal	1,206	49	22%	43%	11%	1,457	50	36%	46%	20%
Russia	3,863	64	6%	34%	2%	4,361	60	17%	37%	8%
Singapore	4,368	154	47%	32%	17%	3,451	98	33%	32%	12%
South Africa	2,340	75	16%	39%	7%	2,546	72	23%	40%	10%
Spain	6,978	368	18%	48%	10%	8,094	334	30%	46%	14%
Sweden	7,496	268	39%	46%	19%	6,918	344	33%	43%	15%
Switzerland	4,912	483	50%	45%	22%	4,249	361	43%	45%	19%
Taiwan	896	56	37%	41%	15%	973	63	42%	41%	18%
Thailand	1,413	22	10%	35%	5%	1,885	31	32%	37%	14%
Turkey	501	24	11%	39%	5%	820	49	46%	42%	21%
UK	41,309	2508	25%	42%	10%	39,568	2149	22%	43%	10%
USA	138,096	11042	15%	48%	7%	129,752	11432	10%	48%	4%
Venezuela	108	7	21%	48%	9%	218	12	61%	54%	35%
World	365,496	21,613	26%	43%	12%	365,496	21,613	38%	44%	18%

Table 3: Specialization Profile of Acquirers and Targets

This table presents the mean and median differences in the degree of specialization between the acquirer's industry (A) and the target's industry (T) at the transaction level. We consider two measures of specialization, where $SP(sales)$ is specialization based on total sales, and $SP(emp)$ is specialization based on total employment. Data on sales and employment are from Worldscope. The sample covers 46 countries, 85 distinct industries and the period 1990-2010. Industries are defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). We report the average and median degree of specialization. We separate transactions between domestic and cross-border. Panel A includes all transactions (N=365,496). Panel B includes all horizontal transactions (N=162,098). Panel C further indicates the fraction of all horizontal cross-border transactions and the fraction of the dollar value in these transactions for which the degree of specialization of the acquirer is larger than that of the target ($A.SP(x) > T.SP(x)$). We test for the significance of the mean (t-test) and median (sign-rank test) difference in the degree of specialization between the acquirer and target, and report the significance levels next to the mean and median for the acquirer. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

<i>Panel A: All Transactions</i>		Domestic	Cross-Border	All
A. SP(sales)	Mean:	1.854***	1.894***	1.863**
	Median:	0.993***	1.094***	1.021***
T. SP(sales)	Mean:	1.981	1.501	1.874
	Median:	1.153	0.823	1.084
A. SP(emp)	Mean:	1.898***	1.908***	1.900
	Median:	0.863***	0.930***	0.870***
T. SP(emp)	Mean:	2.033	1.501	1.915
	Median:	0.968	0.730	0.918

<i>Panel B: Horizontal Transactions</i>		Domestic	Cross-Border	All
A.SP(sales)	Mean:	2.165	1.981***	2.124***
	Median:	1.219	1.235***	1.222
T. SP(sales)	Mean:	2.165	1.458	2.008
	Median:	1.219	0.858	1.124
A. SP(emp)	Mean:	2.246	2.017***	2.195***
	Median:	1.036	1.083***	1.046***
T. SP(emp)	Mean:	2.246	1.467	2.073
	Median:	1.036	0.768	0.963

<i>Panel C: Horizontal Cross-Border Transactions</i>	%(# of deals)	\$ value	%(\$ value)
A.SP(sales)>T.SP(sales)	63.58%	\$2.38 Bn.	67.50%
A.SP(emp)>T.SP(emp)	63.06%	\$2.36 Bn.	66.90%

Table 4: Summary Statistics for the Variables used in the Regression Models

This table presents summary statistics (means, standard deviations, percentiles, and the number of observations) for each variable used in the gravity models we estimate. Observations are at the industry-country-pair level in Panel A, the country-level in Panel B, the country-pair level in Panel C, and the industry-country level in Panel D. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. The sample covers 46 countries, 85 distinct industries and the period 1990-2010. Industries are defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). Δ indicates the difference between acquirer and target country. The unit of observation is at the industry-country pair.

Statistics:	Mean	Std.Dev	25 th	50 th	75 th	N
<i>Panel A: Industry-Country-Pair Variables</i>						
ln(#Acq.)	0.07	0.31	0.00	0.00	0.00	175,950
ln(\$Acq.)	0.14	0.81	0.00	0.00	0.00	175,950
Δ SP(sales) _{WS}	0.00	3.27	-0.53	0.00	0.53	175,950
Δ SP(emp) _{WS}	0.00	3.44	-0.49	0.00	0.49	175,950
Δ SP(sales) _{UNIDO}	0.00	1.92	-0.61	0.00	0.61	77,658
Δ SP(emp) _{UNIDO}	0.00	1.92	-0.61	0.00	0.61	77,658
<i>Panel B: Country-Level Variables</i>						
ln(GDP)	25.33	1.27	24.22	25.15	26.13	175,950
ln(GDP/capita)	8.76	1.16	7.90	9.15	9.71	175,950
ln(Bilateral Trade)	13.14	2.11	11.76	13.19	14.60	175,950
%Tertiary Education	34.20	17.17	23.44	28.82	44.00	160,650
%Education Spending	14.21	3.94	11.52	13.22	15.93	168,300
#Patent/Pop.	491.07	645.01	83.86	221.91	615.01	172,125
#Trademark/Pop.	1287.57	946.12	510.48	1142.51	1664.03	164,475
#Articles/Pop.	358.26	333.97	57.82	275.22	698.74	172,125
<i>Panel C: Country-Pair Variables</i>						
Exchange Rate Return	0.00	0.09	-0.03	0.00	0.03	175,950
ln(Distance)	8.62	1.00	7.92	9.05	9.29	175,950
Common Border	0.05	0.21	0.00	0.00	0.00	175,950
Same Religion	0.30	0.46	0.00	0.00	1.00	175,950
Same Legal System	0.25	0.43	0.00	0.00	1.00	175,950
Same Language	0.11	0.32	0.00	0.00	0.00	175,950
ln(Δ Corporate Tax Rate)	0.07	0.05	0.03	0.06	0.10	175,950
Double-Tax Treaty	0.36	0.48	0.00	0.00	1.00	175,950
Bil. Investment Treaty	0.16	0.36	0.00	0.00	0.00	175,950
<i>Panel D: Industry-Country-Level Variables</i>						
Market-to-Book	1.53	0.69	1.12	1.36	1.73	120,915
Total Assets	1415.19	3959.84	97.98	277.18	940.80	123,165
#Firms	162.80	518.75	18.00	49.00	134.00	123,165
GMS(sales)	1.00	3.39	0	0.04	0.36	175,950
GMS(emp)	1.00	3.22	0	0.05	0.48	175,950
1-Lerner	0.91	0.08	0.88	0.93	0.95	122,940
High Skill (%Comp)	0.18	0.14	0.09	0.15	0.24	73,665
High Skill (%Hours)	0.11	0.10	0.04	0.08	0.15	73,665
Software (%capital)	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	43,290
ICT stock (%capital)	0.08	0.08	0.03	0.05	0.11	43,290
R&D (%capital)	0.02	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.01	123,165
R&D/Assets	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	123,165

Table 5: Specialization and Cross-Border Acquisitions: Baseline Estimation

This table presents cross-sectional Tobit estimations of the baseline gravity model (equation (2)). The dependent variable is the total flow of acquisitions, in number ($\ln(\#Acq.)$) or dollar value ($\ln(\$Acq.)$), in a given industry-country-pair over the 1990-2010 period. The variable of interest, ΔSP , is the average difference in specialization (in a given industry) between the acquirer and the target country over the sample period. We consider two measures of specialization, one based on sales ($SP(sales)$) and one based on employment ($SP(emp)$). The control variables include average acquirer and target country characteristics, as well as country-pair characteristics. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. All specifications include industry fixed effects. Industries are defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). To facilitate economic interpretation, all dependent variables are standardized to have a unit variance. Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer-target country pair level. We report t-statistics in parenthesis. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Dependent Variable:	$\ln(\#Acq.)$		$\ln(\$Acq.)$		$\ln(\#Acq.)$		$\ln(\$Acq.)$	
SP(x):	SP(sales)	SP(emp)	SP(sales)	SP(emp)	SP(sales)	SP(emp)	SP(sales)	SP(emp)
ΔSP	0.146*** (11.93)	0.133*** (11.40)	0.565*** (8.69)	0.496*** (7.92)	0.115*** (10.11)	0.112*** (9.72)	0.466*** (6.98)	0.438*** (6.28)
$\log(Acq. \text{ GDP})$	0.360*** (6.41)	0.360*** (6.38)	1.085*** (4.13)	1.084*** (4.10)				
$\log(Tar. \text{ GDP})$	0.269*** (5.13)	0.269*** (5.12)	0.928*** (3.75)	0.928*** (3.74)				
$\log(Acq. \text{ GDP/capita})$	0.466*** (13.74)	0.464*** (13.67)	1.561*** (10.30)	1.552*** (10.23)				
$\log(Tar. \text{ GDP/capita})$	0.073** (2.35)	0.074** (2.37)	0.207 (1.46)	0.21 (1.47)				
$\log(\text{Bilateral Trade})$	0.623*** (5.73)	0.623*** (5.71)	2.730*** (5.20)	2.729*** (5.17)				
Exchange Rate Return	0.118*** (4.71)	0.120*** (4.81)	0.479*** (4.33)	0.489*** (4.42)				
$\log(\text{Distance})$	-0.279*** (-5.66)	-0.279*** (-5.65)	-0.775*** (-3.23)	-0.776*** (-3.22)				
Shared Border	-0.008 (-0.34)	-0.008 (-0.34)	-0.205* (-1.82)	-0.205* (-1.82)				
Same Religion	-0.004 (-0.16)	-0.004 (-0.16)	-0.193* (-1.73)	-0.193* (-1.73)				
Same Language	0.228*** (8.11)	0.228*** (8.11)	1.014*** (8.12)	1.015*** (8.11)				
Same Legal Origin	0.166*** (5.89)	0.166*** (5.87)	0.591*** (4.63)	0.589*** (4.61)				
$\log(\Delta \text{Tax Rate})$	-0.024 (-1.16)	-0.024 (-1.15)	-0.184* (-1.95)	-0.184* (-1.95)				
Double-Tax Treaty	-0.042* (-1.93)	-0.042* (-1.95)	-0.092 (-0.91)	-0.092 (-0.92)				
Bil. Investment Treaty	-0.018 (-0.87)	-0.019 (-0.88)	-0.139 (-1.44)	-0.14 (-1.45)				
Country-Pair FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
#Obs.	175,950	175,950	175,950	175,950	175,950	175,950	175,950	175,950
Pseudo R ²	0.32	0.32	0.23	0.23	0.10	0.10	0.08	0.08

Table 6: Specialization and Cross-Border Acquisitions: UNIDO Sample

This table presents cross-sectional Tobit estimations of the baseline gravity model (equation (2)). The dependent variable is the total flow of cross-border horizontal acquisitions, in number ($\ln(\#Acq.)$) or dollar value ($\ln(\$Acq.)$), in a given industry-country pair over the 1990-2010 period. The variable of interest, ΔSP , is the average difference in specialization (in a given industry) between the acquirer and the target country over the sample period. We consider two measures of specialization, one based on sales ($SP(sales)$) and one based on employment ($SP(emp)$). We replace the baseline measures of specialization based on Worldscope by two measures based on UNIDO (see Section III.A for details). The sample is thus restricted to manufacturing industries. The control variables include average acquirer and target country characteristics, as well as country-pair characteristics. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. All specifications include industry fixed effects. Industries are defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). To facilitate economic interpretation, all dependent variables are standardized to have a unit variance. Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer-target country pair level. We report t-statistics in parenthesis. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Dependent Variable: SP(x):	ln(#Acq.)		ln(\$Acq.)	
	SP(sales)	SP(emp)	SP(sales)	SP(emp)
ΔSP	0.052*** (2.87)	0.046** (2.52)	0.189* (1.78)	0.198* (1.95)
log(Acq. GDP)	0.340*** (10.36)	0.340*** (10.41)	1.151*** (7.30)	1.156*** (7.38)
log(Tar. GDP)	0.283*** (9.76)	0.284*** (9.76)	1.062*** (7.42)	1.063*** (7.42)
log(Acq. GDP/capita)	0.407*** (12.41)	0.408*** (12.41)	1.277*** (8.48)	1.272*** (8.47)
log(Tar. GDP/capita)	-0.009 (-0.35)	-0.009 (-0.35)	-0.121 (-0.99)	-0.116 (-0.96)
log(Bilateral Trade)	0.732*** (15.18)	0.731*** (15.18)	3.318*** (14.29)	3.313*** (14.30)
Exchange Rate Return	0.122*** (4.85)	0.122*** (4.85)	0.567*** (4.54)	0.568*** (4.54)
log(Geographic Distance)	-0.204*** (-7.99)	-0.204*** (-8.00)	-0.488*** (-3.57)	-0.490*** (-3.59)
Shared Border	-0.004 (-0.22)	-0.004 (-0.22)	-0.211** (-2.15)	-0.211** (-2.15)
Same Religion	0.038* (1.82)	0.038* (1.82)	-0.061 (-0.54)	-0.062 (-0.54)
Same Language	0.139*** (5.80)	0.139*** (5.81)	0.736*** (6.41)	0.737*** (6.42)
Same Legal Origin	0.104*** (4.29)	0.104*** (4.30)	0.404*** (3.45)	0.404*** (3.45)
log(Δ Corporate Tax Rate)	-0.030 (-1.40)	-0.030 (-1.41)	-0.219** (-1.99)	-0.220** (-2.00)
Double-Tax Treaty	-0.049** (-2.44)	-0.049** (-2.44)	-0.108 (-1.04)	-0.107 (-1.04)
Bilateral Investment Treaty	-0.039* (-1.91)	-0.039* (-1.91)	-0.230** (-2.08)	-0.230** (-2.08)
#Obs.	77,658	77,658	77,658	77,658
Pseudo R ²	0.32	0.32	0.22	0.22

Table 7: Identification: Reverse Causality

This table presents cross-sectional estimations of the baseline gravity model (equation (2)). The dependent variable is the total flow of cross-border horizontal acquisitions, in number ($\ln(\#Acq.)$) or dollar value ($\ln(\$Acq.)$), in a given industry-country-pair over the 1990-2010 period. The variable of interest, ΔSP , is the average difference in specialization (in a given industry) between the acquirer and the target country over the sample period. We consider two measures of specialization, one based on sales ($SP(sales)$) and one based on employment ($SP(emp)$). In Panel A, we report two-stage least squares estimations where the dependent variable is the total flow of acquisitions (in # or \$ value) in a given industry-country pair over the 1990-2010 period. We instrument ΔSP using historical adoption rate of innovations from the CHAT dataset. The sample is restricted to 23 industries for which we can clearly identify the underlying technology. We report the second-stage estimates, as well as the t-statistic of the first-stage estimation. In Panel A, we report Tobit estimations where the dependent variable is the total flow of acquisitions (in # or \$ value) in a given industry-country pair over the 2006-2010 period. The variable of interest, ΔSP , is the average difference in specialization (in a given industry) between the acquirer and the target country computed over the period 1990-1995. Baseline control variables (average acquirer and target country characteristics, as well as country-pair characteristics) are included but not reported for brevity. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. All specifications include industry fixed effects. Industries are defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). To facilitate economic interpretation, all dependent variables are standardized to have a unit variance. Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer-target country pair level. We report t-statistics in parenthesis. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Dep. Variable:	$\ln(\#Acq.)$		$\ln(\$Acq.)$	
SP(x):	$SP(sales)$	$SP(emp)$	$SP(sales)$	$SP(emp)$
<i>Panel A: Instrumental Variables (Early Technology Adoption)</i>				
ΔSP	0.033*** (3.16)	0.020*** (3.25)	0.050* (1.69)	0.030* (1.70)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
#Obs.	22,122	22,122	22,122	22,122
Adj. R ²	0.026	0.166	0.086	0.127
1 st -Stage t-stat	9.52***	13.83***	9.42***	13.83***
<i>Panel B: $SP(1990-1995)$ - Acquisitions(2006-2010)</i>				
ΔSP	0.101*** (7.08)	0.086*** (6.51)	0.422*** (4.80)	0.350*** (4.09)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
#Obs.	169,740	169,740	169,740	169,740
Pseudo R ²	0.29	0.29	0.21	0.21

Table 8: Identification: Panel Data Estimations

This table presents panel Tobit estimations of the baseline gravity model (equation (2)). The dependent variable is the total flow of cross-border acquisitions, in number ($\ln(\#Acq.)$) or dollar value ($\ln(\$Acq.)$), in a given industry-country pair. The variable of interest, ΔSP , is the difference in specialization (in a given industry) between the acquirer and the target country. We consider two measures of specialization, one based on sales ($SP(sales)$) and one based on employment ($SP(emp)$). Baseline control variables (average acquirer and target country characteristics, as well as country-pair characteristics) are included but not reported for brevity. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. In Panel A, we split the sample period (1990-2010) into three sub-periods of seven years, and average all variables over these three sub-periods. In Panel B, we consider the full panel of 21 years. All specifications include period fixed effects (seven-year or annual), as well as industry-country-pair fixed effects. Industries are defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). To facilitate economic interpretation, all dependent variables are standardized to have a unit variance. Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer-target country pair level. We report t-statistics in parenthesis. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Dependent Variable:	$\ln(\#Acq.)$		$\ln(\$Acq.)$	
SP(x):	SP(sales)	SP(emp)	SP(sales)	SP(emp)
<i>Panel A: three seven-year sub-periods</i>				
ΔSP	0.010*** (2.58)	0.012*** (3.02)	0.074*** (3.30)	0.105*** (4.10)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-country-pair FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
#Obs.	527,850	527,850	527,850	527,850
Pseudo R ²	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
<i>Panel B: Full Panel of 21 years</i>				
ΔSP	0.008* (1.86)	0.011** (2.41)	0.068* (2.27)	0.105*** (3.25)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-country-pair FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
#Obs.	3,694,950	3,694,950	3,694,950	3,694,950
Pseudo R ²	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

Table 9: Alternative Explanation: Differences in Country-Industry Size?

This table presents cross-sectional Tobit estimations of the baseline gravity model (equation (2)). The dependent variable is the total flow of cross-border horizontal acquisitions, in number ($\ln(\#Acq.)$) or dollar value ($\ln(\$Acq.)$), in a given industry-country pair over the 1990-2010 period. The variable of interest, ΔSP , is the average difference in specialization (in a given industry) between the acquirer and the target country over the sample period. We consider two measures of specialization, one based on sales ($SP(sales)$) and one based on employment ($SP(emp)$). We further include proxies for differences in acquirer and target country-industry size ($\Delta Size$), number of firms ($\Delta Firms$) and valuation (ΔMB), as well as global market shares (ΔGMS). We measure size as the average (logarithm) total assets in each country-industry over the sample period. We measure valuation as the average market-to-book ratio in each country-industry. We measure the number of firms as the average firm count in each country-industry. We measure global market shares as the (average) ratio of total sales (employment) of a given country-industry to global sales (employment) in that industry over the sample period. Baseline control variables (average acquirer and target country characteristics, as well as country-pair characteristics) are included but not reported for brevity. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. All specifications include industry fixed effects. Industries are defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). To facilitate economic interpretation, all dependent variables are standardized to have a unit variance. Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer-target country pair level. We report t-statistics in parenthesis. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Dep. Variable:	$\ln(\#Acq.)$		$\ln(\$Acq.)$		$\ln(\#Acq.)$		$\ln(\$Acq.)$	
SP(x):	SP(sales)	SP(emp)	SP(sales)	SP(emp)	SP(sales)	SP(emp)	SP(sales)	SP(emp)
ΔSP	0.078*** (5.22)	0.071*** (5.17)	0.280*** (3.83)	0.252*** (3.69)	0.105*** (5.93)	0.070*** (3.62)	0.383*** (4.22)	0.260*** (2.61)
$\Delta Size$	0.090*** (7.62)	0.094*** (8.40)	0.445*** (7.35)	0.460*** (7.82)				
$\Delta Firms$	0.068*** (5.38)	0.070*** (5.52)	0.277*** (5.09)	0.285*** (5.22)				
ΔMB	0.006 (0.44)	0.006 (0.42)	-0.005 (-0.06)	-0.005 (-0.07)				
ΔGMS					0.067*** (3.37)	0.092*** (4.24)	0.300*** (3.29)	0.354*** (3.46)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
#Obs.	91,188	91,188	91,188	91,188	175,950	175,950	175,950	175,950
Pseudo R ²	0.29	0.29	0.18	0.18	0.31	0.31	0.22	0.22

Table 10: Alternative Explanation: Product Market Competition

This table presents cross-sectional Tobit estimations of the baseline gravity model (equation (2)). The dependent variable is the total flow of cross-border horizontal acquisitions, in number ($\ln(\#Acq.)$) or dollar value ($\ln(\$Acq.)$), in a given industry-country pair over the 1990-2010 period. The variable of interest, ΔSP , is the average difference in specialization (in a given industry) between the acquirer and the target country over the sample period. We consider two measures of specialization, one based on sales ($SP(sales)$) and one based on employment ($SP(emp)$). In Panel A, we include a proxy for the degree of product market competition in the target country-industry. We measure competition using one minus the Lerner Index. In Panel B, we further interact the difference in specialization with the measure of competition. We present the marginal effect of the difference in specialization when competition is evaluated at the mean or the median sample value (at the bottom of the Table). The baseline control variables (average acquirer and target country characteristics, as well as country-pair characteristics) are included but not reported for brevity. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. All specifications include industry fixed effects. Industries are defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). In this table, the dependent variables are *not* standardized to have a unit variance to facilitate the interpretation of the interaction term. Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer-target country pair level. We report t-statistics in parenthesis. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Dependent Variable: SP(x):	ln(#Acq.)		ln(\$Acq.)	
	SP(sales)	SP(emp)	SP(sales)	SP(emp)
<i>Panel A: Level Effect</i>				
ΔSP	0.044*** (10.70)	0.037*** (10.01)	0.186*** (8.76)	0.154*** (7.89)
Target (1-Lerner)	-0.368** (-2.51)	-0.368** (-2.51)	-1.498** (-2.10)	-1.486*** (-2.08)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
#Obs	122,940	122,940	122,940	122,940
Pseudo R ²	0.30	0.30	0.20	0.20
<i>Panel B: Interaction Effect</i>				
ΔSP	-0.066 (-1.43)	-0.058 (-1.35)	-0.326 (-1.40)	-0.227 (-1.10)
Target (1-Lerner)	-0.455*** (-3.03)	-0.448*** (-3.01)	-1.907*** (-2.59)	-1.814*** (-2.49)
$[\Delta SP] \times [Tar. (1-Lerner)]$	0.122** (2.43)	0.105** (2.28)	0.565** (2.25)	0.421* (1.91)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
#Obs	122,940	122,940	122,940	122,940
Pseudo R ²	0.30	0.30	0.20	0.20
E[ΔSP Mean]	0.043**	0.037**	0.186**	0.154*
E[ΔSP Median]	0.046**	0.039**	0.197**	0.162*

Table 11: Alternative Explanation: Developed vs. Emerging Markets

This table presents cross-sectional Tobit estimations of the baseline gravity model (equation (2)). The dependent variable is the logarithm of the total flow of cross-border horizontal acquisitions, in number ($\ln(\#Acq.)$) or dollar value ($\ln(\$Acq.)$), in a given industry-country pair over the 1990-2010 period. We split the sample in sub-groups of country pairs based on differences between acquirer and target level of development. We consider separate combinations of country-pairs based on the classification of countries as developed (DM) or emerging (EM). The variable of interest, ΔSP , is the average difference in specialization (in a given industry) between the acquirer and the target country over the sample period. Specialization is based on sales ($SP(sales)$). The control variables (unreported for brevity) include average acquirer and target country characteristics, as well as country-pair characteristics. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. All specifications include industry fixed effects. To facilitate economic interpretation, all dependent variables are standardized to have a unit variance. Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer-target country pair level. We report t-statistics in parenthesis. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Dependent Variable:	$\ln(\#Acq.)$			
Country Cuts:	DM-DM	DM-EM	EM-DM	EM-EM
$\Delta SP(sales)$	0.103*** (7.46)	0.244*** (11.91)	0.134** (2.68)	0.299*** (4.54)
#Obs.	46,920	44,880	44,880	39,270
$\Delta SP(emp)$	0.101*** (7.49)	0.223*** (13.08)	0.071 (1.28)	0.303*** (4.49)
#Obs.	46,920	44,880	44,880	39,270
Dependent Variable:	$\ln(\$Acq.)$			
Country Cuts:	DM-DM	DM-EM	EM-DM	EM-EM
$\Delta SP(sales)$	0.417*** (5.45)	0.942*** (8.72)	0.538* (1.81)	1.217*** (4.88)
#Obs.	46,920	44,880	44,880	39,270
$\Delta SP(emp)$	0.395*** (5.24)	0.883*** (9.52)	0.203 (0.67)	1.062*** (3.54)
#Obs.	46,920	44,880	44,880	39,270

Table 12: Deal-level Analysis

This table presents estimates from conditional logit models predicting the probability for a firm to become target (acquirer) in a horizontal cross-border transaction. For each deal, the dependent variable is equal to one for the actual target (acquirer) and zero for five matched targets (acquirers), selected as the closest country-industry observations based on the number of (contemporaneous) transactions, taken from the pool of all country-industry observations with at least one transaction. The variable of interest is the measure of specialization. We consider two measures of specialization, one based on sales (SP(sales)) and one based on employment (SP(emp)). Target or acquirer country characteristics as well as country pairs' characteristics are included but not reported for brevity. . All variables are defined in Appendix 1. All estimations include deal fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the deal level. We report t-statistics in parenthesis. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Dependent Variable: SP(x):	Prob.(Target)		Prob.(Acquirer)	
	SP(sales)	SP(emp)	SP(sales)	SP(emp)
SP	-0.040*** (-11.05)	-0.024*** (-8.17)	0.028*** (12.40)	0.019*** (9.59)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Deal FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
#Obs.	210,461	210,458	208,882	208,882
Pseudo. R ²	0.15	0.15	0.13	0.13

Table 13: Country Human Capital

This table presents cross-country-pairs Tobit estimations of the baseline gravity model (equation (2)) split by differences in countries' stock of human capital. The dependent variable is the total flow of cross-border horizontal acquisitions, in number ($\ln(\# \text{ of Acq.})$) or dollar value ($\ln(\$ \text{ of Acq.})$), in a given industry-country pair over the 1990-2010 period. The variable of interest, ΔSP , is the average difference in specialization (in a given industry) between the acquirer and the target country over the sample period. We consider two measures of specialization, one based on sales ($SP(\text{sales})$) and one based on employment ($SP(\text{emp})$). We measure the stock of human capital using two variables: The fraction of the population that obtains a higher education (Panel A), and the fraction of public spending on education (Panel B). We compute the difference (Δ) in these measures between the acquirer and target country. We partition the sample in two groups, "High" and "Low", based on the median values of the differences (which are zero by construction). The baseline control variables (average acquirer and target country characteristics, as well as country-pair characteristics) are included but not reported for brevity. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Industries are defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). All specifications include industry fixed effects. To facilitate economic interpretation, all dependent variables are standardized to have a unit variance. Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer-target country pair level. We report t-statistics in parenthesis. We further report the p-values corresponding to unilateral (F-)tests of whether the estimate of ΔSP in the High partition are larger than in the Low partition ($H > L$). Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

SP(x): Dep. Var.: Group:	SP(sales)						SP(emp)					
	$\ln(\# \text{Acq.})$			$\ln(\$ \text{Acq.})$			$\ln(\# \text{Acq.})$			$\ln(\$ \text{Acq.})$		
	High	Low	(H>L)	High	Low	(H>L)	High	Low	(H>L)	High	Low	(H>L)
<i>Panel A: $\Delta(\% \text{ Tertiary Education})$</i>												
ΔSP	0.196*** (11.33)	0.100*** (5.44)	(0.000)***	0.690*** (8.18)	0.442*** (4.22)	(0.042)**	0.173*** (10.47)	0.099*** (5.53)	(0.000)***	0.595*** (7.22)	0.412*** (3.99)	(0.079)*
#Obs.	80,325	80,495		80,325	80,495		80,325	80,495		80,325	80,495	
<i>Panel B: $\Delta(\% \text{ Education Spending})$</i>												
ΔSP	0.189*** (10.04)	0.128*** (5.63)	(0.017)**	0.717*** (7.70)	0.493*** (4.27)	(0.073)*	0.170*** (9.94)	0.114*** (5.07)	(0.016)**	0.646*** (7.37)	0.410*** (3.63)	(0.044)**
#Obs.	73,100	73,270		73,100	73,270		73,100	73,270		73,100	73,270	

Table 14: Country Technological Capital

This table presents cross-country-pairs Tobit estimations of the baseline gravity model (equation (2)) split by differences in countries' stock of technological capital. The dependent variable is the total flow of cross-border horizontal acquisitions, in number (ln(# of Acq.)) or dollar value (ln(\$ of Acq.)), in a given industry-country pair over the 1990-2010 period. The variable of interest, ΔSP , is the average difference in specialization (in a given industry) between the acquirer and the target country over the sample period. We consider two measures of specialization, one based on sales (SP(sales)) and one based on employment (SP(emp)). We measure the stock of technological capital using four variables: The ratio of (public and private) R&D spending to GDP (Panel A), the number of patents per capita (Panel B), the number of trademarks per capita (Panel C), and the number of scientific articles per capita (Panel D). We compute the difference (Δ) in these measures between the acquirer and target country. We partition the sample in two groups, "High" and "Low", based on the median values of the differences (which are zero by construction). The baseline control variables (average acquirer and target country characteristics, as well as country-pair characteristics) are included but not reported for brevity. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. All specifications include industry fixed effects. Industries are defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). To facilitate economic interpretation, all dependent variables are standardized to have a unit variance. Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer-target country pair level. We report t-statistics in parenthesis. We further report the p-values corresponding to unilateral (F-)tests of whether the estimate of ΔSP in the High partition are larger than in the Low partition ($H > L$). Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

SP(x): Dep. Var.: Group:	SP(sales)						SP(emp)					
	ln(#Acq.)			ln(\$Acq.)			ln(#Acq.)			ln(\$Acq.)		
	High	Low	(H>L)	High	Low	(H>L)	High	Low	(H>L)	High	Low	(H>L)
<i>Panel A: $\Delta(R\&D/GDP)$</i>												
ΔSP	0.186*** (12.51)	0.105*** (4.93)	(0.001)***	0.688*** (8.63)	0.530*** (4.50)	(0.168)	0.170*** (11.86)	0.095*** (4.44)	(0.001)***	0.611*** (7.89)	0.453*** (3.76)	(0.134)
#Obs.	80,410	80,410		80,410	80,410		80,410	80,410		80,410	80,410	
<i>Panel B: $\Delta(Patent/Pop.)$</i>												
ΔSP	0.180*** (11.57)	0.117*** (5.74)	(0.010)***	0.678*** (8.28)	0.486*** (4.40)	(0.112)	0.168*** (11.42)	0.102*** (5.00)	(0.003)***	0.623*** (7.98)	0.376*** (3.35)	(0.034)**
#Obs.	84,150	84,150		84,150	84,150		84,150	84,150		84,150	84,150	
<i>Panel C: $\Delta(Trademark/Pop.)$</i>												
ΔSP	0.181*** (10.10)	0.126*** (60.73)	(0.025)**	0.691*** (7.89)	0.435*** (4.04)	(0.049)**	0.165*** (9.75)	0.110*** (5.28)	(0.014)**	0.615*** (7.41)	0.351*** (3.19)	(0.026)**
#Obs.	76,755	76,755		76,755	76,755		76,755	76,755		76,755	76,755	
<i>Panel D: $\Delta(Articles/Pop.)$</i>												
ΔSP	0.182*** (12.41)	0.107*** (5.05)	(0.003)***	0.659*** (8.56)	0.543*** (4.48)	(0.239)	0.170*** (12.40)	0.091*** (4.28)	(0.000)***	0.608*** (8.23)	0.421*** (3.44)	(0.090)*
#Obs.	84,150	84,150		84,150	84,150		84,150	84,150		84,150	84,150	

Table 15: Country-Industry Human and Technological Capital

This table presents cross-sectional Tobit estimations similar to the baseline gravity model (equation (2)). The dependent variable is the total flow of cross-border horizontal acquisitions in a given industry-country pair over the period 1990-2010. The flow is in number of deals ($\ln(\#Acq.)$). The variables of interest are average differences in measures of intangibles in a given industry between the acquirer and the target country over the sample period ($\Delta Intangibles$). We consider six measures of intangibles: The stock of R&D, the ratio of R&D over assets, the fraction of high skilled workers in terms of total compensation, the fraction of high skilled workers in terms of total hours worked, the stock of software capital, and the stock of information and communication technology capital. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. The baseline control variables (average acquirer and target country characteristics, as well as country-pair characteristics) are included but not reported for brevity. All specifications include industry fixed effects. Industries are defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). To facilitate economic interpretation, all dependent variables are standardized to have a unit variance. Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer-target country pair level. We report t-statistics in parenthesis. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Measure:	Human Capital		Technological Capital			
	High Skill (%Comp) (1)	High Skill (%Hours) (2)	Software Stock (3)	ICT Stock (4)	R&D Stock (5)	R&D/Assets (6)
$\Delta Intangibles$	0.043*** (3.29)	0.055*** (4.18)	0.072*** (3.57)	0.012 (0.06)	0.027*** (3.36)	0.022*** (2.87)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
#Obs	34,196	34,196	11,544	11,544	94,020	94,020
Pseudo R ²	0.29	0.29	0.30	0.30	0.26	0.26

Table 16: Specialization and Cross-Border Acquisitions (Ex Post) Performance

This table presents OLS regressions on acquirers' change in performance following cross-border horizontal acquisitions. We define performance as operating income over assets, and examine changes from year $t+1$ to year $t+1$ (one-year horizon), or $t+4$ (three-year horizon), where $t=0$ is the year of the acquisition. We restrict to firms that only acquire assets in cross-border horizontal transactions over the three-year horizon. We adjust the performance of each acquirer by subtracting the performance of a matched peer, where peers are the closest firms in terms of size that are active in the country-industry of the acquirer and do not participate in any acquisition during a six-year window surrounding the transaction. The variable of interest, ΔSP , is the difference in specialization between the country-industry of the acquirer and that of the target, measured in year $t=0$. We consider two measures of specialization, one based on sales ($SP(sales)$) and one based on employment ($SP(emp)$). All specifications include the following control variables: logarithm of acquirer assets, the relative size of the acquirer compared to the target, and a dummy variable indicating whether the transaction is a merger. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. Moreover, all specifications include industry, year, and country-pair fixed effects. Industries are defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). To facilitate economic interpretation, all dependent variables are standardized to have a unit variance. Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer-target country pair level. We report t-statistics in parenthesis. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Perf. Measure SP(x): Horizon:	Operating Income (Over assets)			
	SP(sale)		SP(emp)	
	one-year	three-year	one-year	three-year
ΔSP	0.006** (2.17)	0.006** (2.45)	0.004* (1.87)	0.005** (1.96)
log(Assets)	0.006 (1.49)	0.003 (0.75)	0.006 (1.54)	0.003 (0.80)
Acq. Relative Size	0.009*** (4.09)	0.009*** (3.60)	0.009*** (4.02)	0.009*** (3.54)
Merger Dummy	0.001 (1.17)	-0.001 (-0.14)	0.001 (0.22)	-0.001 (-0.11)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-Pair FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
#Obs.	4,343	4,343	4,343	4,343
Adj. R ²	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.20

Figure A: Difference in Specialization by Acquirer Country (Sales)

This figure presents the average difference in specialization between acquirers and target in horizontal cross-border acquisitions by acquirer country based on the two main measures of industry specialization presented in Section III.A. SP(sales) is specialization based on total sales. Data on sales are from Worldscope. The sample covers 46 countries, 85 distinct industries and the period 1990-2010.




Figure B: Difference in Specialization by Target Country (Sales)

This figure presents the average difference in specialization between acquirers and target in horizontal cross-border acquisitions by target country based on the two main measures of industry specialization presented in Section III.A. SP(sales) is specialization based on total sales. Data on sales are from Worldscope. The sample covers 46 countries, 85 distinct industries and the period 1990-2010.




Figure C: Difference in Specialization by Year (Sales)

This figure presents the average difference in specialization between acquirers and target in horizontal cross-border acquisitions by year based on the two main measures of industry specialization presented in Section III.A. SP(sales) is specialization based on total sales. Data on sales are from Worldscope. The sample covers 46 countries, 85 distinct industries and the period 1990-2010.




Figure D: Difference in Specialization by industry (Sales)

This figure presents the average difference in specialization between acquirers and target in horizontal cross-border acquisitions by industry based on the two main measures of industry specialization presented in Section III.A. SP(sales) is specialization based on total sales. Data on sales are from Worldscope. The sample covers 46 countries, 85 distinct industries and the period 1990-2010. Industries are defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2).

